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I. INTRODUCTION
Unsolicited commercial electronic mail (UCE), also known as "spam,"
has far surpassed legitimate electronic mail (e-mail) in online inboxes
around the world.2 Spam accounted for fifty-six per cent of all e-mail in
2003, and is projected to increase to seventy per cent by 2007. 3  This
massive influx of spai has contributed to loss of time and money by both
businesses and individuals.4 According to consulting firm Ferris Research,
spam will cost global companies more than fifty billion dollars in 2005.'
Some users spend thirty to sixty minutes a day sorting through span e-mail





2. See Michael Zuzel, Is 'Spam' Overflowing? Just Learn to Live With It, THE MASTHEAD,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/niqa3771/is_200301/ain9228461 (last visited Mar. 14,
2005). The term "spain" most likely derives from a Monty Python skit in which two diners entered a
restaurant, and every item on the menu contained Hormel spam. See Joshua A. Marcus, Commercial
Speech On the Internet: Spam and the First Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 247
n. 14 (1998). The hosts denied the diners requests for a meal without spain, and eventually everyone
in the restaurant was singing "spam." Id.
3. Zuzel, supra note 2.
4. Marcus, supra note 2, at 247. Some common spain topics are: pyramid schemes, "Get Rich
Quick" schemes, chain letters, pornographic offers,. quack health products, and illegally pirated
software. See The Problem, at http://www.cauce.org/about/problem.shtm (last visited Mar. 14,
2005).
5. Richi Jennings, The Cost of Spain Webinar (Mar. 5, 2005), at http://www.ferris.com/view-
content.php?o=Spam+Control&id=719&ferrisresearch_mainPSID=a47d242fe2d992ec3d7e5l4acc
d4b7ed (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
6. Zuzel, supra note 2.
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In an attempt to minimize its volume, states have enacted anti-spain
legislation that ranges from requiring specific labels to be included in e-mail
subject lines to prohibiting the sending of unsolicited e-mail altogether.7
Most recently, California put forward an "opt-in" statute, which requires the
explicit consent of the recipient prior to sending any commercial e-mail.8
There are, however, some constitutional problems with anti-spain
legislation. The dormant Commerce Clause, which applies to all state laws
that affect interstate commerce, prevents state legislatures from applying
their anti-spain statutes to spammers outside the state. 9  The First
Amendment, which guarantees some protections to commercial speech, also
plays a large role in the scope of restrictions intended to reduce commercial
e-mail.'°
The federal government became involved in the legislative game by
enacting the Can-Spam Act in December 2003.1 That Act contains a
variety of provisions to ensure that senders of e-mail do not falsify their
origins and what they are claiming to sell. It also mandates that all
commercial e-mail messages contain a legitimate reply address by which
recipients can opt-out of future mailings.
1 2
Critics have said that the Act has done nothing more than legalize spam,
and that it has failed to decrease the amount of spam.13 Also, as a result of
the legislation, more stringent opt-in schemes, like California's, are pre-
empted by the less restrictive federal law.
14
Meanwhile, in European countries, the Directive on Privacy and
Electronic Communications promulgates an opt-in provision similar to that
of California's pre-empted law.' 5  The Directive is currently being
transposed into E.U. member countries' laws. Critics remain skeptical about
that Directive's effect though, since what constitutes "consent" for purposes
of opting-in is relatively low and easy for marketers to circumvent.'
6
As a result of ineffective laws, spam continues to grow and infiltrate our
7. See David E. Sorkin, Spam Laws, at http://www.sparlaws.con/state (last visited Mar. 14,
2005).
8. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17529-.9 (West Supp. 2005).
9. See Troy L. Booher & Mark Morris, A Case for National E-mail Regulation: State UCE
Statutes Have Infirmities, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 355, 360 (2003).
10. See infra Part II.A.l. for a full discussion of the Commercial Speech Doctrine.
11. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699-2719 (2003).
12. Id. § 5(a)(3)(A)(i).
13. See David Ho, Anti-Spam Measures Fail to Foil Rise in Junk E-mail, PALM BEACH POST,
Jan. 27, 2005, at 7D.
14. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act § 8(b)l.
15. Council Directive 2002/58/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (2002) [hereinafter Dir. 2002/58/EC],
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/1_201/1_20120020731en00370047.pdf.
16. See Danny Lee, Spam Too Slippery for the Law, TIMES NEWSPAPERS, LTD., Dec. 16, 2003, at
8.
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personal and professional lives. The issue remains whether it will ever be
eliminated, or whether the law is simply the hand of Sisyphus, ever pushing
the rock of spain uphill, where, when it believes it has reached the top, will
simply roll back down with a flood of new issues to invade our inboxes
evermore.
In Part II, this comment will take a look at the history of state actions
and legislation that have confronted the spam issue. Part III will analyze the
constitutional issues that courts have encountered, such as First Amendment
rights, personal jurisdiction, and the dormant Commerce Clause. Part IV
will include a discussion and constitutional analysis of the recently enacted
Can-Spam Act of 2003. In Part V, anti-spam provisions in Europe, such as
the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications in Europe, will be
explored. Finally, in Part VI, a look at self-regulation measures and recently
adopted technologies will leave us with the question of whether spam will
ever be completely deleted.
II. HISTORY OF ANTI-SPAM ACTIONS AND STATE LEGISLATION
Before there was spam, there was junk mail. Sweepstakes entries and
pornographic magazines alike found their way to the private mailboxes of
hapless individuals with little power to control what the eyes were to find.
That was, until the landmark case of Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't. 7
Rowan upheld the constitutionality of a section of the Postal Revenue and
Federal Salary Act that prohibited "'pandering advertisements in the
mails."" 8 The Court weighed the right to communicate against the right to
be "free from sights, sounds, and tangible matter we do not want," and
reasoned that a "mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of
an unreceptive addressee."' 9 Thus, the recipient was given some power to
control what landed in his mailbox.
After junk mail, direct marketers turned to the telephone as another
source of attracting business. Calls advertising the next best vacation plan
became (and sometimes still are) the source of great frustration for families
sitting down to dinner when the phone rang. Businesses also suffered from
blocked lines on their facsimiles while they received offer after offer of
unnecessary and sometimes fictitious services.2°  Then, the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) was amended to prohibit
unsolicited faxes and prerecorded calls to residential numbers and
businesses.21
17. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
18. Id. at 729. At issue was Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967,
which allowed an individual recipient to require a mailer to "remove his name from its mailing lists
and stop all future mailings to the householder." Id. The section was a "response to public and
congressional concern with use of mail facilities to distribute unsolicited advertisements that
recipients found to be offensive because of their lewd and salacious character." Id. at 731.
19. Id. at 736-37.
20. See generally Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (1995).
21. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(B)-(C).
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A new advertising medium was discovered in 1978 by one Gary Thuerk,
a marketing manager for Digital Equipment Corporation, who sent out an ad
for "real estate open houses over a network of government and university
computers. 2  Although network administrators warned him not to do it
again, and the medium went quiet for over a decade, electronic marketing
quickly took off again when the Internet became a major tool for mass
communication in the early 1990s.
23
Electronic solicitation took charge when two lawyers in Arizona in 1994
posted a Green Card immigration ad on over six thousand Usenet news
groups.24 By generating around thirty thousand e-mail messages with a mere
thirty dollars, the lawyers generated fifty thousand dollars in business.25 The
Internet quickly became a popular medium for advertising, largely due to the
low cost of reaching millions of consumers instantaneously, and the
assumption that Internet users were typically more educated and financially
sound.26
Quickly thereafter, spam slammed e-mail inboxes with the potency of
the famous meat-replacement in the Monty Python skit.27 Because e-mail
viewers were charged by the minute to read their content, and unlikely to
discern ad mail from regular mail, the resulting cost shift from advertisers to
consumers became an immediate attraction to marketers and political
activists alike.28
A. Civil Anti-Spam Actions
1. Trespass to Chattels
Along with the increase of spam came an onslaught of cases under
various action headings. Trespass to chattels was a common action due to a
number of lawsuits brought by AOL in the Eastern District of Virginia,29 as
22. Matthew Heller, Lost In The Cyber-Kudzu; "Legitimate" Internet Marketers Such as LA. 's
Alyx Sachs Have Built an Industry Around the Assumption That You Thoughtfully Evaluate Each
Unfamiliar E-Mail Before Hitting the "Delete" Button. You Still Do That, Right?, L.A. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Dec. 12, 2003, at 24. The network was the forerunner of the Internet. Id.
23. Id.
24. Marcus, supra note 2, at 248 (citing Peter H. Lewis, Advertiser Unfazed By Internet Outrage,
SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Apr. 26, 1994, at 3). Usenet groups are online forums through which
users can communicate in real-time on various topics of interest. See, e.g., Google Groups,
http:/groups.google.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
25. Marcus, supra note 2, at 248.
26. Id.
27. See supra note 2.
28. Marcus, supra note 2, at 249.
29. See Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc., v.
LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998); America Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F.
Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Va. 1999).
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well as the notable CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.3 ° in the
Southern District of Ohio in 1997. In CompuServe, the defendants took
advantage of the plaintiffs online subscriber service by sending thousands
of unsolicited advertisements via electronic mail to CompuServe's
subscribers, despite CompuServe's requests to stop.31 The Ohio court relied
on the Restatement (Second') of Torts § 217(b), which provides that "a
trespass to chattel may be committed by intentionally using or intermeddling
with the chattel in possession of another,"32 to find that the defendant's
intrusion into CompuServe's systems was sufficiently tangible to constitute
trespass.33 The court reasoned that the loss of disk space and processing
power caused harm to CompuServe's business reputation and the goodwill
of its customers.34
The action was upheld against the defendant's arguments that
CompuServe had consented to its use by providing a service that allowed
subscribers to receive e-mail from anyone on the Internet.35 Because
CompuServe had notified the defendant that it no longer consented to its use
of the computer equipment, and because the CompuServe policy denied
unauthorized parties the ability to send unsolicited e-mail, the defendant's
continued use was a trespass.36
2. False Designation of Origin and Trademark Dilution
In America Online, Inc. v. IMS, plaintiffs brought two additional actions
against a spammer for false designation of origin and trademark dilution
under the Lanham Act.37 The Lanham Act "is designed to make actionable
the misleading use of marks in interstate commerce and to protect those
engaged in interstate commerce against unfair competition. 38
To find defendants liable under false designation of origin, the plaintiffs
in AOL had to prove the elements of a three part test: "(1) the alleged
violator must employ a false designation; (2) the false designation must
deceive as to origin, ownership or sponsorship; and (3) the plaintiff must
30. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
31. Id. at 1017.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. See also America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F, Supp. 2d 548, 551 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding
that defendant's intentional and unauthorized transmission of 60 million unsolicited e-mails resulted
in AOL's loss of goodwill and business, and was unquestionably actionable in trespass).
35. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023-24.
36. Id. at 1024. The court relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217, Comment f, which
states: "The actor may commit a new trespass by continuing an intermeddling which he has already
begun, with or without the consent of the person in possession. Such intermeddling may persist after
the other's consent, originally given, has been terminated." See id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Cf Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (denying an injunction for an
action in trespass against a defendant who transmitted multiple e-mails through his former
employer's computer system, but caused no physical damage or functional disruption).
37. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
38. Id.at551.
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believe that 'he or she is likely to be damaged by such [an] act.' ' 39  The
court in AOL found that because defendant's messages contained "aol.com"
in the header, they were likely to cause confusion as to the source of origin."
Furthermore, AOL members were actually deceived into thinking that AOL
approved of the defendant's bulk mailing tactics, and such confusion caused
damage to AOL's business.41
In response to the action for trademark dilution, the court applied §
1125(c) of the Lanham Act to assess whether another person's use of AOL's
famous mark diluted its distinctive quality. 2 AOL was required to show
ownership of the mark and the likelihood of dilution, through either
"blurring" or "tarnishment." 43 The court found that plaintiffs clearly owned
the AOL mark, since it was registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, and it was "used and recognized throughout the world" in connection
with its online products and services.44 AOL also proved the likelihood of
dilution by pointing to more than 50,000 complaints a day regarding the
defendant's junk e-mail.45  As a result, AOL was entitled to summary
judgment on both counts.46
3. Breach of Contract
Plaintiffs have also been successful in suing spammers for breach of
contract. In Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc. ,4 ' a California district
39. Id. at 551 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)). See also America Online, Inc., v. LCGM, Inc., 46
F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998). This case established a five part test for false designation of
origin: "(1) a defendant uses a designation; (2) in interstate commerce; (3) in connection with goods
and services; (4) which designation is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to origin,
sponsorship, or approval of defendant's goods or services; and (5) plaintiff has been or is likely to be
damaged by these acts." Id. at 449.
40. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 551.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 552. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
43. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 552. "[D]ilution by 'blurring' may occur where the defendant uses or
modifies the plaintiff's trademark to identify the defendant's goods and services, raising the
possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiffs product."
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).
"'Tarnishment' generally arises when the plaintiffs trademark is linked to products of shoddy
quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts
about the owner's product." Id.
44. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
45.' Id. at 552. See also America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(upholding actions under the Lanham Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Virginia's Computer
Crimes Act, and trespass to chattels).
46. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 552. The amount of damages awarded to AOL was deferred until a
Report and Recommendation was issued, detailing the proof. See id.; see also Classified Ventures v.
Softcell Mktg., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 898, 901 (N.D. 11. 2000) (finding that defendant's
unauthorized use of the plaintiffs "name and mark in connection with defendant's spain e-mail
messages constitute[d] service mark infringement, dilution and unfair competition").
47. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
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court found that by obtaining a number of Hotmail's mailboxes and using
them to facilitate the sending of spam and pornography, defendants
expressly breached Hotmail's "Terms of Service., 48
Similarly, a Canadian court upheld a counterclaim for breach of
"emerging principles of Netiquette" where plaintiffs sent bulk e-mail at the
rate of 200,000 e-mails per day.49 The plaintiffs actions were contrary to a
contractual provision with the Internet service provider that users would
agree to follow accepted "Netiquette" when sending e-mail messages.50
This "breach of Netiquette" principle was analogized to a breach of contract,
and the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim in favor of the defendant. 5t
4. Remedies
Civil actions against spammers have also resulted in injunctions, money
damages, or both. In Register.corn v. Verio, Inc., for example, the plaintiff
sought an injunction barring defendant from using automated software to
access and collect information for the purpose of mass marketing.52 The
District Court of New York granted a preliminary injunction because the
plaintiff was able to show that it would suffer irreparable harm without such
relief, and it was likely to succeed on claims of unfair competition and false
designation of origin. 3 Alternatively, plaintiffs received damages in
America Online, Inc. v. National Health Care Discount, Inc., where the
Northern District Court of Iowa found that defendant's e-mailers, who had
sent 135 million pieces of e-mail to the plaintiff ISP's members, had
committed an actionable trespass.54 The defendants were liable for $2.50
per thousand pieces of unsolicited bulk e-mail, for total actual damages in
48. Id. at *16-17. The "Terms of Service" specifically prohibited the unauthorized use of
commercial e-mail and pornography. Id. at * 17. The court in that case also upheld actions under the
Lanham Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Fraud and Misrepresentation, and Trespass to
Chattels. Id. at *9-20.
49. See Ontario Inc. v. Nexx Online, Inc., [1999] O.R. 3d 40.
50. Id. at 41, 50. Plaintiffs here sued the defendants for breach of contact when the latter
disconnected the plaintiff's website after it continued to send bulk e-mails. Id. However, "plaintiff
[was] in breach of its terms justifying disconnection of service." Id. at 50. The court articulated six
reasons why spam was considered "unacceptable":
(1) the recipient pays far more, in time and trouble as well as money, than the sender
does, unlike advertising through the postal service;
(2) the recipient must take the time to request removal from the mailing list, and most
spamners claim to remove names on request but rarely do so;
(3) many spammers use intermediate systems without authorization to avoid blocks set up
to avoid spam;
(4) many spain messages are deceptive and partially or entirely fraudulent[;]
(5) spammers often use false return addresses to avoid the cost of receiving responses;
(6) some forms of spam are illegal in various jurisdictions in the United States.
Id. at 45-46.
51. Id.
52. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 356 F.3d 393
(2d Cir. 2004).
53. Register.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
54. America Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 900 (N.D. Iowa
2001).
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the amount of $337,500.5'
Courts have even allowed substantial monetary damages against
spammers. In Earthlink, Inc. v. Carmack, the court awarded a judgment of
$16,409,640 against a spammer who had used stolen or bogus credit card
and bank account numbers to fraudulently purchase hundreds of dial-up
Internet accounts.5 6 The extraordinary judgment in that case resulted from a
combination of various costs incurred by Earthlink as a result of the
defendant's violations, as well as punitive damages intended "to serve as a
clear message ... that such crime and misconduct will not be tolerated. 57
In sum, without specific anti-spam legislation in place, it has been
possible to sue spammers in common law tort and breach of contract actions,
as well as under federal trademark and computer abuse statutes. Before the
federal Can-Spam Act,58 it appears from the cases cited above that the most
successful actions were brought by large ISPs against the most egregious
violators.59 In response to the increasing number of common law actions,
however, many states began to legislate against spam in an attempt to
provide clearer criminal and civil remedies, and a forum through which
injured companies and consumers, as well as ISPs, could rid the world of
spam.6
B. State Legislation
In December 2003, thirty-six states had enacted some kind of legislation
against spam. 61 These "Unsolicited Commercial E-mail" ("UCE") statutes
usually fall into two categories: 1) provisions against the falsifying of
information, such as inaccurate subject headers or untruthful routing
information; and 2) provisions that require conduct, like subject matter
labeling (e.g. "ADV: ADULT" for sexually explicit material) or "opt-out"
mechanisms (allowing the recipient to unsubscribe from future mailings). 62
The first category usually withstands constitutional challenges and will not
be discussed in detail here, while the latter may be subject to dormant
55. Id. at 901. The district court here permanently enjoined the defendant from sending further
unsolicited e-mails through the plaintiff's system. Id. at 902.
56. Earthlink, Inc. v. Carmack, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9963 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
57. Id. at*19.
58. See infra Part IV.
59. See cases cited supra Part II.A.
60. See Sorkin, supra note 7. Legislatures have also legitimized regulating spam due to the
extraordinary amount of cost-shifting and burden imposed on consumers. See Jack L. Goldsmith &
Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 818 (2001)
("Bulk e-mail can raise costs to Internet service providers and Internet users in terms of wasted time,
slower operating systems, lost accounts, repairs, equipment, and the like.").
61. See Sorkin, supra note 7.
62. Booher & Morris, supra note 9, at 360.
1029
Commerce Clause and First Amendment scrutiny.6 3
For example, a statute from the second category was recently enacted in
Texas. 64 That statute requires subject lines to begin with "ADV" for general
advertisements and "ADV: ADULT ADVERTISEMENT" for any adult
material. 65 Texas is also one of the few states to grant qualified immunity to
Internet service providers (ISPs). 66 This allows ISPs to sue spammers for
clogging their wires, but does not allow a spam recipient to sue the ISP for
its role in spamming.67
Additionally, Utah passed the "Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually
Explicit Email Act, '68 allowing for hundreds of class action suits against
both local and national defendants. 69  This Act requires "ADV" in the
subject line for commercial e-mails, and "ADV: ADULT" for sexually
explicit e-mails.7°
Also in the second category, the Virginia anti-spain statute claims to be
the toughest law, since nearly half of the world's Internet traffic passes
through that state via AOL, Inc.7t Spammers who produce the most
offensive and persistent e-mail solicitations face a class six felony, which
carries a prison term of between one and five years, plus a fine.72 The law
also authorizes the Attorney General to seize profits, computer equipment
and all property connected with the crime.73
Most recently, California enacted an amendment to its existing anti-
spam legislation, prohibiting advertisers from sending unsolicited
commercial e-mail without the prior consent or existing business
relationship of the recipient.74 This "opt-in" amendment came into effect in
January 2004.7' The provision applies to all senders of unsolicited e-mail
who are located in California, as well as those not located in California
sending junk e-mail to California recipients.76 The bill authorizes the
recipient of unsolicited e-mail to recover actual damages, or liquidated
63. See infra Part i.
64. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 46.001-.0011 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
65. Id. § 46.003.
66. Id. § 46.011.
67. John D. Saba, Jr., eProclamation: No More Spam in Texas, 66 TEXAS BAR J. 660.
68. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-36-101-105 (Supp. 2004).
69. See Gregory M. Saylin & Spencer J. Cox, The Unsolicited Email Act and Anti-Spam
Litigation, 16 UTAH B.J. 26 (2003).
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-36-103.
71. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-323.1, 18.2-152. (Michie 2003); see also Virginia Claims
Toughest Anti-Spam Law in Nation, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW, July 2003, at 34.
72. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-153.1B (Michie 2003).
73. Id. §§ 2.2-511, 18.2-152.1, 152.12. Virginia's statute has survived due process challenges at
the district court level. See Verizon Online Servs. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(extending long-arm jurisdiction under VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 to out-of-state defendants who
sent unsolicited bulk e-mail to an ISP in Virginia, over a challenge that the statute violated the due
process clause).
74. CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17529.2-4 (West 2003).
75. Id. § 17529 (West Supp. 2003).
76. Id. §§ 17529.2-4 (West Supp. 2003). This provision has recently been pre-empted by the
Can-Spam Act. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, § 8(b), 117 Stat. 2699, 2716 (2003).
1030
[Vol. 32: 1021, 2005] Is Spam the Rock of Sisyphus?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
damages in the amount of $1000 per e-mail, up to $1,000,000 per incident.77
Because these statutes run the gamut in terms of conduct required and
conduct prohibited, inconsistent standards abound.. Accordingly, some
defendant spammers have asserted personal jurisdiction or due process
defenses in states where they are not residents.78 Several statutes have also
been challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause, which prevents states
from enacting legislation that affects residents across state borders.79
Finally, underlying any action against an e-mail advertiser, whether brought
in tort or under statute, is the extent of First Amendment protection
available.8°
Each of these constitutional issues will be discussed in turn, beginning
with an analysis of the First Amendment as it applies to the Internet and to
advertising in general.
LII. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech....,,81 Courts have often been divided over
the application of this Amendment to different types of speech.
In Rowan, the mailer's right to communicate was challenged only by an
affirmative act of the addressee notifying the sender that he did not want
further mailing from that sender. 82 Relying on the ancient notion that "'a
man's home is his castle,"' the Court reasoned that "[n]othing in the
Constitution compels us to listen to or view any unwanted communication,
whatever its merit. " 83 "[N]o one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an
unwilling recipient. ' 84
However, the Internet is an entirely different medium for purposes of
communication. A strict standard of review has been in place since Reno v.
ACLU85 when the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he Internet [g]ets [flull
First Amendment [pirotection. ' '86 The Court distinguished Reno from FCC
77. § 17529.8.
78. See, e.g., Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch, Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681 (E.D. Va. 1999); Verizon v.
Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002), discussed infra Part III.B.
79. See, e.g., State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001); Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal
Rptr. 2d 358 (2002), discussed infra Part IL.C.2.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
81. U.S.CONST. amend. 1.
82. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 738.
85. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
86. Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1170 (1999). In
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v. Pacifica Foundation,8" where it found that First Amendment interests
could be curtailed for broadcast media when there was a privacy interest at
stake, but only where capable of transmitting patently offensive material
directly into people's homes.88 In refusing to draw an analogy between the
Internet and broadcast media, the Reno Court reasoned that warnings could
be more effective on the Internet, whereas in broadcasting they could not
protect viewers from undesired content.89 In addition, there was only a
remote possibility of encountering indecent material on the Internet by
mistake, "Internet sites were not [as] scarce" as broadcast channels, "there
was no extensive history of government regulation over the Internet," and
the Internet did not share the invasive qualities of broadcast media.90
While Reno concerned the regulation of indecent material over the
Internet, anti-spain policies and regulations fall under the broader category
of commercial speech.91 The extent of protection available for commercial
speech has been transformed through recent cases. Thus, a review of the
Commercial Speech Doctrine as it has evolved over the last half century is in
order.
1. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
Commercial speech has historically been afforded much less protection
than political and other noncommercial speech.92 The reason for the
distinction, as Justice Stevens articulated in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Reno, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), which was an attempt to regulate the
"knowing transmission of 'obscene or indecent' messages to any recipient under 18 years of age,"
came under constitutional attack. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The Supreme Court agreed
with the lower court decision that the CDA was constitutionally overbroad, thereby chilling the
expression of adults. Reno, 521 U.S. at 862. The Court also found that terms used in the regulation,
such as "patently offensive" and "indecent," were "inherently vague." Id.
A strict scrutiny standard requires the Government to "show that the challenged restriction on
speech is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest and that no less restrictive
alternative would further that interest." Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,
454 (2002) (citing United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)). Under a
rational basis review, on the other hand, "the challenged restriction need only be reasonable." Id.
87. 438 U.S. 726 (1977).
88. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 278.
89. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
90. See Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REv. 521, 531 (2003) (citing Reno,
521 U.S. 844, 867, 868-69 (1997)). Perhaps the Reno Court's partial reliance on the argument that
the Internet is less invasive than television is somewhat obsolete, now that advertising on the Internet
has become more accessible. As one author has remarked: "Reno's assurance that 'The Internet Gets
Full First Amendment Protection' can look pretty thin when there are 49,000 new messages in your
inbox, or when your so-called cyberlife consists of deleting ads for pyramid schemes and porn sites."
Wu, supra note 86, at 1173.
91. "Commercial" speech is "expression related. solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience." Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980).
92. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("Rather than subject
the First Amendment to such... devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a
limited measure of. protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.").
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Island, is "to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive
sales practices. 93 However, numerous cases demonstrate that courts will
allow the First Amendment to trump statutes or regulations that inhibit
commercial speech without substantial justification.94
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
NY was the first significant case to set down the standard of review for
statutes that attempt to regulate commercial speech. 95 The Supreme Court in
Central Hudson reasoned that, although the Constitution affords commercial
speech less protection than other types of speech, "[c]ommercial expression
not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information.,
96
Central Hudson announced a four-part test to determine whether the
commercial speech at issue was constitutionally protected.97 First, the
expression "must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. 98  The
second question is whether or not the government's interest in regulating is
substantial.99 If both of these inquiries yield positive answers, the court
"must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and [finally,] whether it is not more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest.'' ° The latter two prongs of the test have
been tweaked by subsequent cases.
0 1
Modifying the third prong of the Central Hudson test, for example, the
Court in Edenfield v. Fane established that "a government body seeking to
uphold the constitutionality of a restriction of commercial speech 'must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in
fact alleviate them to a material degree.',1 02 However, in United States v.
93. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
94. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 440 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761, 762 (1993); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
557.
95. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557. In that case, the New York Public Service Commission
had promulgated a regulation that banned promotional advertising by electric utility companies
operating in the state. Id. at 558. Appellant argued that the ban was a violation of its First
Amendment rights. Id. at 560.
96. Id. at 561-62.
97. Id. at 566.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. In essence, the court in Central Hudson modified the "strict scrutiny" standard of review,
by which the Supreme Court has traditionally applied a two part test to fundamental rights to
determine if: 1) there is a compelling state interest for the state to regulate, and 2) the means are
narrowly tailored to further that interest. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (laying
out the strict scrutiny test).
101. For a full discussion of the development of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, see generally
Marcus, supra note 2.
102. Id. at 274 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 762 (1993)).
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Edge Broad. Co., the Court allowed more flexibility to the Government in
proving its harms, stating that the Government need not "make progress on
every front before it can make progress on any front."' 3 In that case, the
Court found that a federal statute barring radio broadcasts of state lotteries
by radio licensees in non-lottery states did not violate the Constitution since
it furthered the state interest in avoiding exposure by citizens in the non-
lottery state to lottery advertising.' °4 The government needed only show that
the regulation reduced the advertising, which would correspond to a
decrease in demand for gambling.'0 5
The Supreme Court refined the application of the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test in Board of Trustees v. Fox,'° 6 when it held that
regulations that inhibit commercial speech will pass the test only if they are
"'narrowly tailored' to serve a significant governmental interest."'' 0 7 That fit
did not necessitate the "best" fit, but merely one that was in proportion to the
interests served.'08
2. An Exception for Private Actors
Private actors do not have a duty to protect speech to the same extent as
state actors.1°9 Therefore, in common law actions by ISPs and individuals
against spammers, the First Amendment has not been a successful
defense." 0  In CompuServe, for example, defendants relied on the First
Amendment to argue that they had a right to continue sending spam to
plaintiffs computer systems."' However, CompuServe is a private actor
rather than the government or a public utility."12 The court in CompuServe
admitted that if a private actor has some amount of control over a central
avenue of communication, it may be treated like a public utility, and held to
the same First Amendment standard." 3 Nevertheless, the First Amendment
103. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993).
104. Id. at 434.
105. Id.
106. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
107. Id. at 478. In this case, a university had promulgated regulations concerning the use of
school property for commercial purposes. Id. at 471-72. Students who had been arrested for
violating the regulation sought a declaratory judgment against the university under the overbreadth
doctrine (which allows suits by plaintiffs where First Amendment rights have been violated). Id.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision, since it had not determined
the validity of the university's resolution in the context of commercial and non-commercial speech.
Id. at 486.
108. Id. at 478. This standard was interpreted to require not the elimination of all less restrictive
means available, but only that the regulation not burden "substantially more speech than is necessary
to further the government's legitimate interests." Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
109. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("[T]he constitutional guarantee of free
speech is a guarantee only against abridgement by government, federal or state.") (citing Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)).
110. See supra Part Ul.A.
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did not trump a private actors' right to bring a common law action for
trespass where there were adequate alternative avenues of communication
for the defendants."
4
Thus, although the Commercial Speech Doctrine plays a large role in
determining the application of anti-spam legislation to public utilities and
state actors, it has not been a successful defense against private actors.
B. Personal Jurisdiction and Due Process
Another major issue to overcome in an action against spammers is one
of jurisdiction. "[A]nonymity and decentralization of the Internet means that
individual jurisdictions may not have the resources to locate and prosecute
even the most egregious spammers." ' 15 However, even when they are able
to locate those individuals, state courts face the problem of bringing them
within the state's long-arm statute, and finding intent on the part of the
defendant to reach consumers and businesses within that state.
For example, in Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp.," 6 the issue was
whether the defendant, a Texas corporation, had performed a sufficient
number of Internet activities to bring it within the jurisdiction of the
plaintiffs home state, Virginia." 7 In that case, the plaintiff sued Rannoch
Corp. for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act due to the use of its
name in commerce." 8 The plaintiff asserted that jurisdiction was established
by the ability of Virginia residents to access the defendant's domain name." 9
The district court of Virginia followed a two step process to determine
jurisdiction:
First, courts must ascertain whether a plaintiff has made a prima
facie showing that Virginia's long-arm statute reaches the non-
resident defendant given the cause of action alleged and the nature
114. Id. at 1026; see also, Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. American Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436
(E.D. Pa. 1996):
By providing its members with access to the Internet through its e-mail system so that its
members can exchange information with those members of the public who are also
connected to the Internet, AOL is not exercising any of the municipal powers or public
services traditionally exercised by the State....
Id. at 442. The defendant in that case likewise was not subject to First Amendment protection in
sending unsolicited advertisements via AOL's e-mail network where alternative means of
communication still existed. Id. at 442-43.
115. Bruce E.H. Johnson, Is There a Constitutional Right to Bombard the Public with Penis
Enlargement Proposals?, COMM. LAW., Summer 2003, at 3, 5.
116. 52 F. Supp. 2d 681 (1999).
117. Id. at 682.
118. Id. Here, the plaintiff was a Virginia corporation that sold computer and engineering services
in the field of aviation. Id. The Defendant of the same name was a one-person business, operating
out of Texas and providing activities for individuals who enjoyed steam railroading. Id.
119. Id.at683.
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of the defendant's Virginia contacts. Second, a court must
determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the
circumstances is consistent with the Due Process Clause, that is,
whether the long-arm statute's reach in the circumstances exceeds
its constitutional grasp. 2
0
The court reached the conclusion that although the defendant's activities
may be sufficient to support jurisdiction under Virginia's long-arm statute, it
was not enough to satisfy the due process analysis.' 21 It reasoned that the
mere placement of a website on the Internet with knowledge that a Virginia
resident might access it was not sufficient to show purposeful availment of
the laws of Virginia, any more than the laws of another state.
122
The Eastern District of Virginia again reviewed the issue of personal
jurisdiction in Verizon Online Services, Inc. v. Ralsky.23 In Verizon, the
plaintiffs sued for trespass to chattels after the defendants sent millions of
unsolicited bulk e-mails to the plaintiff's online subscribers. 124 The court
applied Rannoch's two-step process, but reached the opposite conclusion.
25
Purposefully sending e-mails to recipients with accounts through a Virginia
ISP, thereby causing a tort in Virginia, was purposeful availment of the laws
of Virginia, and thus subject to the state's long-arm statute. 12 6 The court
explained that "[b]y allegedly transmitting millions of e-mails to make
money at Verizon's expense, knowing or reasonably knowing that such
conduct would harm Verizon's e-mail servers, Defendants should have
expected to get dragged into court [in the state] where their actions caused
the greatest injury.' 27
These cases indicate that personal jurisdiction will continue to be an
issue for actions against spammers at the state level. If spammers have not
intentionally availed themselves of the laws of another state by knowingly
sending their messages across borders, it will not be easy for a recipient
resident of that state to sue them.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 687. "[T]he Due Process Clause requires that no defendant shall be haled into court
unless defendant has 'certain minimum contacts [with the state] ... such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Id. at 685 (quoting
Intern'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). Jurisdiction is only appropriate where the
defendant has purposely directed his activities toward residents of the state in question and the
litigation arises out of those activities. Id.; see also Media3 Tech., LLC v. Mail Abuse Prevention
Sys., LLC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1310 (D.C. Mass. 2001). This court listed several additional
factors for finding that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable:
(1) the burden imposed on the defendant by requiring an appearance in the state; (2) the
forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief; (4) the judiciary's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of the controversy; and (5) public policy concerns.
id. at *18-19 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).
122. Rannoch, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 685-86.
123. 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002).
124. Id. at 604.
125. Id. at 617-18.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 618-19.
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C. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The most common avenue of attack against UCE statutes is via the
"dormant" Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 2 8 the name given to the
negative implication of the Commerce Clause.129 The Commerce Clause
grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States."'' 30 The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
is "the principle that the states impermissibly intrude on this federal power
when they enact laws that unduly burden interstate commerce."' 13 1
The Supreme Court has articulated a variety of tests to distinguish
between the types of state regulations the Commerce Clause permits, and
those it prohibits. 132 The tests include:
(1) whether a state statute explicitly favors in-state over out-of-state
economic interests (the "protectionist test"); 133
(2) whether a statute's practical effect is "to control conduct beyond
the boundaries of the state" (the "extraterritorial effect test");'3
(3) whether a sufficiently negative "effect would arise if not one,
but many or every, state adopted similar[, but inconsistent,]
legislation" (the "inconsistent regulation test"); 35 and
(4) whether the benefit the state receives from the statute is clearly
outweighed by the burden that it imposes on interstate commerce
(the "undue burden test"). 136
The "protectionist" test usually will not apply to UCE statutes since they
do not openly discriminate against out-of-state interests, treating all
spammers alike. 37 But the "extraterritorial effects" test applies where the
statutes "regulate activities that occur wholly outside the state that has
enacted such a statute.' 38 Almost every UCE statute fails that test. 139 For
128. Booher & Morris, supra note 9, at 355.
129. Id. at 356.
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
131. State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 409 (Wash. 2001).
132. Booher & Morris, supra note 9, at 356.
133. Id. (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986)).
134. Id. (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 419 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989)).
135. Id. (citing Healy, 419 U.S. at 336-37) (alteration in original).




example, some statutes extend jurisdiction to non-residents within the limits
of the state's long-arm statute, some apply to any e-mail sent through an in-
state network, some apply where the sender has reason to know that it will
reach the state's residents, and some have various other limitations that
could affect out-of state citizens.' 4° As a result, it is virtually impossible for
senders to know which statutes govern their conduct, and the "states with the
most restrictive UCE statutes effectively regulate the conduct of all
senders. ,,141
UCE statutes may also fail the "inconsistent regulation" test since the
labeling requirements vary from state to state.1 42  Some statutes require
"ADV:" in the subject line for general advertisements, while others require
"ADV: ADVERTISING."' 43  Some require "ADV: ADLT" for sexually
explicit material, while others require "ADV-ADULT."'
44
Finally, the statutes could foreseeably fail the "undue burden" test where
senders do not know which statute will apply to their commercial e-mail,
resulting in higher costs to comply with all such provisions and lost
opportunities to consumers.
45
1. Application to Internet Regulation
Both federal and state cases have applied the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis in Internet regulation cases. In American Libraries Ass'n v.
Pataki,146 plaintiffs challenged a statute that attempted to regulate the
Internet transmission of material that was harmful to minors.147 The New
York district court applied the extraterritorial effects test to find that website
owners and senders had no way of ensuring that New York residents were
unable to access their sites. 148 It was thus impossible to limit the statute to
activities within the state of New York. 149 The statute also failed the undue
burden test because the costs associated with complying with the statute
were excessive in relation to the benefit conferred on the state. 5° Finally, in
139. Id.
140. Id.; see also Sorkin, supra note 7.
141. Booher & Morris, supra note 9, at 357.
142. Id.; see also Sorkin, supra note 7.
143. See generally Sorkin, supra note 7.
144. See id.
145. Booher & Morris, supra note 9, at 357-58.
146. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
147. Id. at 163-64. The statute at issue was N.Y. Penal Law § 235.21(3) (McKinney 2004). Id.
148. Id. at 177.
149. Id.
The nature of the Internet makes it impossible to restrict the effects of the New York Act
to conduct occurring within New York. An Internet user may not intend that a message
be accessible to New Yorkers, but lacks the ability to prevent New Yorkers from visiting
a particular Website or viewing a particular newsgroup posting or receiving a particular
mail exploder.
Id.
150. Id. The court reasoned that although the protection of children from harmful sexual material
was a "quintessentially legitimate state objective," the state could not avoid the second part of the
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applying the "inconsistent regulation" test, the court expressed the view that
the Internet demanded consistent treatment through national regulation, or it
would be paralyzed altogether.15' Thus, the district court struck the statute
as unconstitutional.1
5 2
2. Application to Anti-Spain Legislation
Courts have applied a slightly different Commerce Clause analysis in
UCE statute cases. In State v. Heckel,'53 the Supreme Court of Washington
overturned a lower court decision that the state's UCE statute was "'unduly
restrictive and burdensome"' on interstate commerce.1 54  Rather than
applying each of the four tests above, the court applied a two-part analysis to
determine 1) "whether the state law openly discriminates against interstate
commerce in favor of intrastate economic interests"'155 and, if not, 2) whether
the interstate burden is balanced with the local benefits.
156
The statute at issue in Heckel was in the first category of statutes that
prohibit conduct, 157 applying to senders who knew or had reason to know
they were sending fraudulent e-mails to Washington residents. 5 " The
test, which required it to assess the impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 177-78. Imposing such a
burden on senders whose only contact with the state was via the Internet would be analogous to
"New York bounty hunters dragging pedophiles from the other 49 states into New York." Id. at 178.
Furthermore, the chilling effect on the worldwide net would likely exceed the number of cases
prosecuted in New York. Id. at 179.
151. Id.atl8l.
The Internet, like the rail and highway traffic at issue in the cited cases, requires a
cohesive national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine
their obligations. Regulation on a local Level, by contrast, will leave users lost in a
welter of inconsistent laws, imposed by different states with different priorities.
Id. at 182; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (striking
down on similar grounds a New Mexico statute (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-37-3.2) that prohibited the
electronic dissemination of harmful materials to minors). "Even if it is limited to one-on-one e-mail
communications... there is no guarantee that a message from one New Mexican to another New
Mexican will not travel through other states en route." Id. at 1161.
152. Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 183-84.
153. 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001).
154. Id. at 406.
155. Id. at 408 (Wash. 2001).
156. Id. at 409. This test is based on the view that the "extraterritorial effects," "inconsistent
regulations" and "undue burden" tests are rolled into one. See Booher & Morris, supra note 9, at
359; see also Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 60, at 804 ("[The] extraterritoriality analysis under the
dormant Commerce Clause must be more fine-grained. It must, that is, distinguish between
permissible and impermissible out-of-state costs that result from the regulation of cross-border
externalities."). Likewise, the "inconsistent regulations" test simply enhances the "undue burden"
test by highlighting a potential risk of allowing states to create different regulatory regimes in
relation to the benefits conferred on the state. See Booher & Morris, supra note 9, at 359; see also
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 60, at 807 ("[Tjhe proliferation of different state regulations may
impose compliance costs that outweigh any plausible regulatory benefits. Viewed this way, the
inconsistent-regulations cases, too, are a variant of balancing analysis.").
157. See supra Part I.B.
158. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.
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Washington court upheld the regulation since it narrowly prohibited the use
of any misleading information in commercial e-mails. 59 The benefit of
limiting potential harm to Washington businesses outweighed any
conceivable burden to the e-mail senders. 60
UCE statutes in the second category that require conduct' 6 1 have
likewise been challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause.' 62  In
Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., the California Court of Appeals rejected the
American Libraries notion that any regulation of the Internet was a violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause. 63 Although the statute at issue broadly
encompassed "conduct by persons or entities doing business in California
who transmit unsolicited advertising materials,"' 64 the court applied a
balancing test like that in Heckel to determine that
California has a substantial legitimate interest in protecting its
citizens from the harmful effects of deceptive UCE and ... section
17538.4 furthers that important interest. By requiring disclosure of
the advertising and/or adult nature of an unsolicited e-mail in the
subject line, section 17538.4 establishes a quick and simple way of
identifying UCE without having to read it first.' 6
'he statute's benefits outweighed the burden on interstate commerce, by
facilitating the elimination of fraud and deception.' 66  The additional
requirements, such as "ADV:" in the subject line, caused a negligible burden
in light of the state's interests. 167 Thus, the dormant Commerce Clause again
159.. Heckel, 24 P.3d at 413.
160. Id.
161. See supra Part ll.B.
162. See Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (Ct. App. 2002).
163. Id. at 260.
164. Id. The former California statute required:
that a "person or entity conducting business in this state" who causes an unsolicited e-
mail document to be sent (1) establish a toll-free telephone number or valid sender
operated return e-mail address that recipients may use to notify the sender not to e-mail
further unsolicited documents; (2) include as the first text in the e-mailed document a
statement informing the recipient of the toll-free number or return address that may be
used to notify the sender not to e-mail any further unsolicited material; (3) not send any
further unsolicited advertising material to anyone who has requested that such material
-not be sent; and (4) include in the subject line of each e-mail message "ADV:" as the first
four characters or "ADV:ADLT" if the advertisement pertains to adult material.
Id. (citation omitted).
165. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268.
166. Id.. The court relied on Heckel to find that truthfulness requirements only deterred spammers
from sending fraudulent e-mail, and thus directly reduced the volume of spam. Id. (citing State v.
Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 411 (Wash. 2001)).
167. Id. ("[T]he cost of placing particular letters in the subject line of the e-mail and including a
valid return address in the message itself 'is appreciably zero in terms of time and expense."'
(quoting California's Attorney General)). Others argue that California actually misapplied the undue
burden test, since the fact that the California statute did not prohibit falsification, but only required
"ADV:" in the subject line made it harder to justify the limited benefits that such a statute would
provide. Booher & Morris, supra note 9, at 364.
However, this California anti-spam statute was still in effect when a judgment of two million
dollars was entered against a bulk e-mailer under section 17538 in 2004. See Liane Jackson,
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proved unsuccessful as a challenge to a UCE statute..
Nevertheless, possibly out of fear that challenges to state statutes would
succeed, overloading the courts and creating inconsistent standards with
respect to Internet regulation, the federal government pushed legislation that
would apply to spammers on a national level. 68 This federal legislation will
at least eliminate the issues associated with the dormant Commerce Clause
and Personal Jurisdiction. However, Commercial Speech protection may
still be relevant and will be discussed below.
IV. THE CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003
A. The Law
After numerous revisions and various nicknames, the Can-Spain Act
(the "Act") was introduced into Congress in January 2003 as "An Act To
regulate interstate commerce by imposing limitations and penalties on the
transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic mail via the Internet."' 69
After being signed into law by the President in December 2003, it took
effect in January 2004.170
The Act was based on findings that the convenience or efficiency of
electronic mail was being compromised by the unprecedented growth of
unsolicited commercial e-mail.'17  Bulk e-mails had resulted in costs not
only to recipients who could neither control the rate nor the amount
received, but also to Internet service providers and businesses with
infrastructures that could not handle the volume.172 Furthermore, a growing
number of e-mails consisted of pornographic, false or misleading
California Reins In Spammers; State of California v. Willis, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 2004, at 50
("Santa Clara County prosecutors are hoping a $2 million judgment against a spammer will serve as
a deterrent to others sending junk mail over the Internet. The hefty penalty is the largest to date
against senders of unsolicited e-mail, and it's the first such lawsuit in California."). The bigger
problem is how to collect the judgment, since the defendants did not even show up in court. Id.; see
also Complaint for Injunction, Civil Penalties and Other Equitable Relief, State v. Willis, (Super. Ct.
Cal. 2002) (No. CV811428).
168. Some commentators fear that the Act was actually rushed into law to pre-empt California's
more stringent opt-in provision. Just A Start; Anti-Spain Law Is a Good Start, but it Needs to be
Strengthened, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 20, 2003, at B4 [hereinafter "Just A Start"].
169. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7701). For an analysis of the proposed
Can-Spam Act when it was introduced in 1999, see Vasilios Toliopoulos, Legislative Updates:
Regulating Your Internet Diet: The Can-Spam Act of 1999, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. &
POL'Y 175 (1999). For an in-depth discussion of various other anti-sparn proposals, see also, Derek
D. Simmons, Comment, No Seconds On Spam: A Legislative Prescription to Harness Unsolicited
Commercial E-mail, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 389 (1999).
170. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act § 16.
171. Id. § 2(a)(2).
172. Id. § 2(a)(4),(6).
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information in the subject lines, some disguising the source, and many
failing to provide recipients with an opt-out mechanism. 73 On the basis of
these findings, Congress determined that the government had a substantial
interest in nationwide regulation of false and misleading commercial e-
mail.17
4
The Act applies to senders who:
1) use a protected computer without authorization,175
2) intend to deceive recipients as to the message origin by using
another server,1
76
3) materially falsify the header information, 177
4) register five or more accounts with a materially false identity,171
or
5) falsely represent oneself to be the owner of a registered
address. 179
The Act also provides for criminal penalties for repeat and serious
offenders.180
173. Id. § 2(a)(5), (7)-(9).
174. Id. § 2(b).
175. 18 U.S.C.§ 1037(a)(1). This provision is specifically directed toward some common
techniques that spammers use to obtain e-mail addresses, such as "harvesting" and hacking into
another person's computer system to send UCE from that system. See Controlling the Assault of
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act § 4(b)(2)(A)(i). "Harvesting" is a technique through
which sparnmers can generate a number of e-mail addresses by using a software program that
compiles lists from websites, user groups, and chat rooms. See Email Address Harvesting: How
Spammers Reap What You Sow, FTC Consumer Alert, available at http:// www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/
pubs/alerts/spamalrt.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). Spammers can also hack into other systems by
inserting a "Trojan Horse" program, a program that takes control of unsuspecting downloader's
computers. See S. REP. No. 108-170 (2003).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)(2). This provision criminalizes the spammer technique of using third
parties' open servers to re-transmit e-mail without the server owner's knowledge. See S. REP. No.
108-170.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)(3). The Act defines "materially falsified" as information that "is altered
or concealed in a manner that would impair the ability of a recipient of the message.., to identify,
locate, or respond to a person who initiated the electronic mail message..." Id. § 1037(d)(2). The
purpose of this provision is to allow users to be able to identify trusted senders and use "white lists"
to receive e-mail only from those senders. See S. REP. No. 108-170.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)(4). This provision targets a spammer technique called "account
churning," by which a spammer can register for multiple accounts using false information and send
bulk spain from one after the other. See S. REP. No. 108-170.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)(5). This provision attacks the hacker spamming technique of hijacking
large blocks of unused Internet addresses and using them to send spain. See S. REP. No. 108-170.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1037(b). Enhanced penalties are provided against those convicted of various
other fraud and sexual exploitation offenses if they involve sending mass amounts of mail. Can-
Spam Act, supra note 12, at § 4(b)(2)(B).
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The Act requires a valid return e-mail address or other mechanism by
which the recipient can opt-out of future e-mail.' 8' Each message must
contain clear identification as an advertisement, notice of the recipient's
opportunity to opt-out, and a valid physical postal address of the sender. 182
After a recipient requests to opt-out, the sender or any of its agents must
cease all unsolicited e-mail to the recipient within ten business days. 183
With regard to civil remedies, the Act allows each state's attorney
general to bring an action in the local district court to enjoin a defendant
from further violations, or to obtain damages in the amount of loss suffered
by the state's resident recipient.1 84  Statutory damages are available, up to
$250 per e-mail violation, with a two-million-dollar maximum. 85 Damages
are also available to Internet service providers (ISPs) who are adversely
affected by the spammer's violations. 186 Although the Can-Spam Act pre-
empts state statutes that require conduct, 8 7 it does not eliminate those that
prohibit conduct, such as the falsification of information in the body of the
e-mail. 88  It also allows ISPs to continue implementing anti-spam
policies. 189
The Act contains several provisions for future implementation and
consideration. It calls for the FTC to consider a "Do-Not-E-Mail" registry,
similar to the FTC's recently implemented "Do-Not-Call" registry. 190
Finally, Congress asks for international cooperation as studies on the
effectiveness of cross-border enforcement against spammers continue.' 9'
181. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act § 5(a)(3)(A).
182. Id. § 5(a)(5)(A). This does not apply if the recipient has given prior affirmative consent, of
course. Id. § 5(a)(5)(B). A separate prohibition is included for the transmission of any unsolicited
"sexually oriented material" via commercial e-mail without clear labeling as prescribed by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). See id. § 5(d). The FTC has 120 days after the enactment of the
Act to prescribe the marks to be used for such sexually oriented material. Id. § 5(d)(3). Criminal
penalties are prescribed against those in violation of this provision as well. Id. § 5(d)(5).
183. Id. § 5(a)(4)(A)(i). It is also illegal for the sender to sell or lease the recipient's e-mail
address to another party after such request. Id. § 5(a)(4)(A)(iv).
184. Id. § 7(f)(1), (3). Injunctive relief is also available without a showing of knowledge on the
part of the defendant. Id. at § 7(f)(2).
185. Id. § 7(f)(3)(A)-(B).
186. Id. § 7(g). These could include an injunction, actual losses, or statutory damages in the
amount of one hundred dollars per 5(a)(l) e-mail violation (prohibition against false or misleading
information) or twenty-five dollars per any other violation, up to one million dollars. Id. § 7(g)(1),
(3).
187. Such statutes include those that require specific subject header labeling and opt-in or opt-out
mechanisms. See Sorkin, supra note 7; see also infra § H.B.
188. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act § 8(b)(1). The Act
also does not extend to actions brought under state trespass, contract, or tort law, or laws that relate
to fraud or computer crime. Id. § 8(b)(2).
189. Id. § 8(c).
190. Id.§9.
191. Id. § 10(b)2.
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B. Criticism and Commentary
There are a variety of different opinions on the immediate effect of the
new federal legislation. Some commend Congress' effort to institute a
national standard for spam regulation, while others emphasize the number of
issues that the Act does not eliminate.
BigFootlnteractive, a provider of strategic electronic marketing
solutions, praised the positive effects of the law, such as pre-emption of state
laws, identification of fraudulent uses of e-mail, and prohibition of
"harvesting."'' 92  The Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail
(CAUCE), a leading anti-spam activist group, has noted, however, that the
law gives limited enforcement capabilities to "overworked regulatory and
law enforcement agencies, rather than giving consumers legal tools with
which to protect their own inboxes."1 93 CAUCE has also remarked that the
Act "gives each marketer in the United States one free shot at each
consumer's e-mail inbox," forcing companies to use costly anti-span
technologies and company resources to block the messages.'
194
European anti-spain activists have called the Act a "serious mistake"
since it only regulates rather than prohibits spam. 195  By, actually making
spam legal in the United States, the Act is essentially inviting an onslaught
of unsolicited messages from Asia, and areas with even less prohibitions.1 9
6
Frustration has also been expressed at the fact that some states' tougher
anti-spam measures will be circumvented by a less impactful federal law.
19 7
By pre-empting statutes that require conduct, such as the prior explicit
consent of a user (opt-in), the Act essential back tracks any progress states
have made in the way of eliminating spam. CAUCE remarked that
California's opt-in law, which was set to go into effect in January 2004, was
192. BigFootnteractive, Commentary on the Can-Spain Act of 2003 (S.877), available at:
http://www.bigfootinteractive.com/canspam/CAN-SPAMCommentary.pdf (last visited Mar. 14,
2005). This group has also put out some suggestions for improving upon the Act. Id.
193. See CAUCE Statement on Can-Spain Act [hereinafter CAUCE Statement], available at
http://www.cauce.org/news/2003.shtml (Dec. 16, 2003). CAUCE opines, from the standpoint that
unsolicited commercial e-mail should be outlawed altogether, that the law was passed with scarcely
any input from the marketing industry and ISP lobbies, or "the interests of America's consumers and
business Internet users." Id
194. CAUCE Statement, supra note 193. This is a reaction to the opt-out scheme provided for in
the Act, which allows a first time e-mail transmission to a recipient, as long as the latter is given a
means to reject future unsolicited commercial e-mails. See also Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, § 5(a)(3)(A), 117 Stat.
2699, 2707 (2003). CAUCE Chairman Scott Hazen Mueller worries that:
[i]t only makes that spare slightly more truthful. It also gives a federal stamp of approval
for every legitimate marketer in the U.S. to start using unsolicited e-mail as a marketing
tool. Congress has listened to the marketers and not to consumers, and we have no faith
that this law will significantly reduce the amount of spam that American Internet users
receive.
CAUCE Statement, supra note 193.
195. See Spamhaus Position on CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (S.877/HR 2214), available at http://
www.spamhaus.org/position/CAN-SPAM-Act2003.html (Dec. 20, 2003).
196. See id.
197. Just A Start, supra note 168.
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passed because the opt-out law was found to be a failure. 98 In support of
pre-emption, however, Can-Spam advocates point to the issues inherent in
state regulation of a borderless problem. 99
While consumers and business owners seem generally concerned over
the effectiveness of the new law, there are also constitutional concerns that
prevent Congress from acting more broadly.2°° These concerns are of more
direct relevance to the analysis in this Comment.
C. First Amendment Analysis
In assessing the constitutionality of the Act, courts will likely return to
the Commercial Speech doctrine as articulated in Central Hudson, and
clarified in subsequent cases. 201 Senator Hatch has remarked that the Act 202
does not raise constitutional concerns because "rather than targeting speech,
the bill instead targets e-mailing techniques used to steal computer services
,203
and trespass on private computers and computer networks." Furthermore,
it "addresses only commercial e-mail messages... and only when such
messages are misleading by virtue of falsifying their point of origin. 20 4
Thus, the first prong of Central Hudson would not be satisfied.20 5
Despite this assurance that the Act is constitutionally sound, the Federal
Trade Commission may follow through with some of the Act's suggestions,
such as subject header requirements, a "Do-Not-E-mail" registry, and
cooperation with international fora.20 6 In those contexts, it may be necessary
to consider some potential constitutional arguments.
1. Labeling Requirements
There is a likely First Amendment challenge against labeling
requirements imposed by the government,2 7 based on limitations to
compulsory speech recognized in various precedent cases.20 8 The argument
198. CAUCE Statement, supra note 193.
199. See BigFootnteractive, supra note 191.
200. See S. REP. No. 108-170 (2003).
201. See supra Part II.A. 1.
202. See S. REP. No. 108-170, at 4. His comments were specifically related to the Criminal Spam
Act, an amendment to the Can-Spam Act. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (holding
that in commercial speech cases, a court must first determine that the expression concerns lawful
activity and is not misleading).
206. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-187, §§ 10(b)(2), 11(2), 117 Stat. 2699, 2717 (2003).
207. Id. § 11(2); see also id. § 5(d) (requiring explicit labeling of any sexual material that may be
harmful to minors).
208. See Johnson, supra note 115, at 8 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) and
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would likely turn not on the actual content of the speech required, like
"ADV" in the e-mail subject line, but rather on the effect of the labeling.2°
The label would allow users to more easily filter all spam, effectively
shutting down solicitation by e-mail. 210  However, the distinction from
precedent cases upholding this argument is that, although the government
may impose the label, it is the user who is ultimately making the decision to
filter out e-mail, after the sender has had an opportunity to reach him or
her.211 Thus, the burden placed on the sender by the labeling requirement is
minimal, and courts would likely find a reasonable fit between the
government's purpose in preventing the transmission of false information
and the means imposed by the Act.
21 2
Currently, the Act merely requires honest subject lines, so that
consumers will not be tricked into opening misleading messages.21 3 Thus,
constitutional arguments against compulsory speech will likely be
unsucessful.
2. The "Do-Not-E-Mail" Registry
The Can-Spam Act also calls for the FrC to consider the
implementation of a "Do-Not-E-mail" registry, much like the "Do-Not-Call"
registry provided for in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).214
"[Eighty-three percent] of Americans are either extremely or very likely to
register for the [do-not-e-mail] list making it more popular than the
telemarketing 'do-not-call list.' 2- 1 5 At the same time, the Direct Marketing
Association (DMA) has expressed some concern that a "Do-Not-E-Mail"
registry would do nothing but forestall the ability of legitimate e-mail
marketers to reach consumers.216
If the list is ultimately implemented despite these concerns, it would be
helpful to review the TCPA and recent commercial speech challenges to that
Act, in order to predict potential constitutional problems.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (striking down a requirement that
electric utility companies include messages from opposing consumer groups in its envelopes)).
209. Johnson, supra note 115, at 8.
210. Johnson, supra note 115, at 8.
211. Id.
212. See supra Part lI.A.
213. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-187, § 5(a)(2), 117 Stat. 2699, 2706-07 (2003). See also Jacquelyn Trussell, Is the Can-
Spam Act the Answer to the Growing Problem of Spam?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 175, 182
(2004).
214. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act § 9; see also
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991). A "Do-
Not-E-Mail" registry would essentially operate as a national database on which individuals could
place their names and e-mail addresses to opt-out of receiving future unsolicited e-mails.
215. Americans Ready to Delete Spam for Good; Survey Finds 83% Are Likely to Register for a
"Do-Not-Spam List" Bus. WIRE, Dec. 19, 2003 [hereinafter Americans Ready]. The statement was
made by a representative from Synovate, a leading global market research firm. Id.
216. See Press Release, Direct Marketing Association, The DMA Supports National Ant-Spain
Law (Dec. 8, 2003), at http://www.the-dma.orglcgi/disppressrelease?article=531.
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a. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)
The TCPA was amended in 1991 to prohibit unsolicited faxes and
prerecorded telephone calls to a residential line or business.217  In
Destination Ventures v. FCC, a direct marketing company that advertised
via facsimile argued that the TCPA's restrictions were unconstitutional,
since the government had singled out unsolicited advertisements, without
showing that they were any less damaging than prank faxes or other types of
faxes.218 In considering this challenge, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rearticulated the commercial speech doctrine:
219
Regulation of commercial speech must directly advance a
substantial governmental interest in a manner that forms a
"reasonable fit" with the interest .... The burden is on the
government to demonstrate the reasonable fit.... The
government's burden "is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a
restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree.
220
Applying this analysis, the court disagreed with the direct marketer's
argument, finding no dispute that "unsolicited commercial fax solicitations
are responsible for the bulk of advertising cost shifting., 221 Congress' ban
was reasonable in light of its goal to reduce those costs, and the First
Amendment did not require complete elimination of cost shifting before
proactively addressing this problem.222 Thus the TCPA has withstood
217. See generally Telephone Consumer Protection Act §§ 1-4. These provisions were clarified in
a recent case against a telemarketer who violated the TCPA by calling an Ohio resident with a
prerecorded message. Charvat v. Crawford, 799 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio 2003). In that case, the
defendants argued that their calls were not "advertising" within the meaning of the Act, since they
were simply providing the recipient with an opportunity to receive information. Id. at 663, 665
(citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(10)). The Ohio court disagreed, holding that "a prerecorded message
that contains free offers and information about services and that asks the consumer to call a toll-free
number to learn more is an unsolicited advertisement under the TCPA if sent without the called
party's express invitation or permission." Id. at 666. Such calls were inadmissible under the Act.
Id.
218. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995).
219. See supra Part III.A.1.
220. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55-56 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas and Elec. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566; Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); and quoting
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
221. Id. at 56.
222. Id. at 56. See also Covington & Burling v. Int'l Marketing & Research, Inc., 2003 WL
21384825, *3-4 (D.C. Super. Ct. April 27, 2003). In that case, the defendant sent 1,634 unsolicited
faxes to the plaintiffs business, advertising vacation packages, advanced cellular communications,
and more, despite repeated demands to stop. Id. The D.C. Superior court found that defendant's
advertisements were misleading because they did not identify their senders, and thus failed even the
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constitutional scrutiny at the circuit court level. However, the "Do-Not-
Call" list that was implemented as a result of the TCPA has been somewhat
more controversial.223
The National Do-Not-Call Registry is now managed and enforced by the
FTC, the FCC, and the States. 224 As of October 2003, the registry is "open
for business, putting consumers in charge of the telemarketing calls they get
at home ' 225 by allowing them to put their names on a national database that
must be checked by marketers prior to making solicitations by telephone.
Critics of a "Do-Not-E-Mail" list would likely point to recent challenges
against this federal Do-Not-Call list.226  -
In Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v. FTC, the district court in
Colorado sustained an argument that the registry would create a burden on
commercial speech, by singling it out from other types of speech.227  The
court began by applying the first prong of Central Hudson to determine that
the registry was overbroad, since it affected all commercial speech whether
or not it was deceptive.228 Applying the second prong of Central Hudson,
the court acknowledged that the government had a substantial interest in
"protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home [as] the
highest order in a free and civilized society.2 29 However, the third and
fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test were not satisfied, since the
interests did not justify treating commercial speech differently than non-
commercial speech.230 The district court reasoned that the harms sought to
first prong of the Central Hudson test. Id. at *3. Under the second and third prongs of Central
Hudson, the court found that the government's interest in protecting consumers from the economic
burden of unsolicited advertising was substantial enough to outweigh the defendant's commercial
speech rights. Id. Finally, under the fourth prong, Congress' interest was not excessive, since it did
not ban advertising by fax entirely, but merely required the consent of recipients before doing so. Id.
at *4.
223. The Federal Trade Commission enacted a Rule with guidelines similar to that of the FCC's
TCPA. 16 CFR Part 310; see also "Do Not Call" Provisions of Telemarketing Sales Rule, 64 Fed.
Reg. 66124 (Nov. 24, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/tsrrulemaking/
tsrfrn991124.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). The Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) was
promulgated in response to a congressional directive in the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and
Abuse Prevention Act "to prescribe rules prohibiting deceptive and abusive telemarketing acts or
practices." Id. at 66125 (citing 51 U.S.C. § 6101). Enacted into law in December 1995, this TSR
similarly contains provisions for the implementation of a national "Do-Not-Call" registry. Id.
Unlike the TCPA, which provides a private right of action for consumers who receive telemarketer
calls in violation of the FCC's regulation, the TSR can be enforced by the Commission or the States.
Id.
224. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE Do NOT CALL REGISTRY, at http://www.ftc.gov/
donotcall/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
225. See id
226. See, e.g., Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Colo. 2003); see
also Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D.N.D. 2003).
227. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1168. Since there were exemptions for
political or charitable speech, the argument was that there should be a privacy-based or prevention-
of-abuse reason in support of such disparate treatment. Id.
228. Id. at 1162.
229. Id. at 1164. The court relied on the ancient notion expressed in precedent cases that "a man's
home is his castle," and the right to be left alone was "'the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men."' Id. (citations omitted).
230. Id. at 1167.
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be prevented by banning commercial calls were just as likely to continue
with non-commercial calls.2 3
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision
in February 2004.232 Deviating from the district court's analysis of the final
two prongs of Central Hudson, the court found a "reasonable fit" between
the registry and the justifications.233 "A reasonable fit exists between the do-
not-call rules and the government's privacy and consumer protection
interests if the regulation directly advances those interests and is narrowly
tailored., 234 The court rearticulated the "narrowly tailored" standard as not
the least restrictive measure available, but merely a "proportional
response. 235
In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit first denied the telemarketer's assertion
that the registry was under-inclusive because it did not apply to political or
charitable callers. 236  It reasoned that under-inclusiveness of commercial
speech was a basis for a First Amendment claim only if it made the
regulatory framework so irrational that it failed to advance its goals.237 The
Do-Not-Call list, however, would reduce a substantial number of invasive or
abusive calls, thereby directly advancing the government's goals.238
The Tenth Circuit also found that the registry was narrowly tailored
because it did not over-regulate protected speech, but simply restricted
unwanted calls.239 Furthermore, the regulation was not too restrictive, since
"both sellers and consumers [were left] with a number of options to make
and receive sales offers."240
The Tenth Circuit finally rejected the telemarketers' proposed
alternatives, such as a company-specific approach, by which companies
maintain their own do-not-call lists. 24' The court reasoned that this approach
put the burden on the consumer to call every telemarketing company, such
requests were often ignored, and the method had already been proven
ineffective.242 Thus, there were no less burdensome alternatives that would
accomplish the government's objectives equally well.243
231. Id.
232. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 47 (2004).
233. Id. at 1238.
234. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65
(1980)).
235. Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,480 (1989)).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1238-39.
238. Id. at 1240.
239. Id. at 1241.
240. Id. at 1243.
241. Id. at 1244-45.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1245.
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A similar analysis was recently applied in Fraternal Order of Police v.
Stenehjem, in which charitable organizations challenged a state statute that
prohibited telemarketers (both commercial and non-commercial) from
calling residents who registered for a state do-not-call list.244  The court
found that the portions in the statute regarding charitable speech were
overbroad, since unlike commercial speech, charity involves speech that is
fully protected by the First Amendment. 245 With regard to the commercial
portions of the statute, however, the court found that there was a "reasonable
fit" between the legislative goals and the means chosen to accomplish
them.246  The court reasoned that the do-not-call lists deter fraudulent
telemarketers and allow an individual householder the private choice to
decide whether or not to put his or her number on the list.2 47 Finally, the
statute did not ban commercial calls altogether, and it left marketers with
reasonable alternatives to advertise.248  Thus, the portions of the statute
pertaining to commercial speech withstood constitutional scrutiny.
These cases show that "do-not-call" lists, whether provided for
nationally or at the state level, will pass constitutional muster if they target
solely commercial speech, and leave the power to opt-out in the hands of the
individual.
b. Application to the Can-Spam Act
Given the outcome of these recent cases, it is likely that a "Do-Not-E-
Mail" list would also be constitutionally sound, since the FTC's goals to
prevent fraud and protect privacy within the realm of spam are the same as
those in telemarketing. 249 Moreover, allowing consumers to put their own
names on a national list would protect the sacred principle of individual
autonomy.25°
A distinction may be made between span and telemarketing, however,
in the fact that e-mail has been considered less intrusive than the telephone
call. As noted in dicta in Mainstream:
The intrusion upon residential privacy at issue here is the ringing of
a telephone. That ringing may be more frequent than the consumer
would like. It may come at times which are inconvenient. It may
be disruptive. Unlike junk mail or electronic span, it cannot be
244. Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D.N.D. 2003).
245. Id. at 1028. For fully protected speech cases, the first inquiry is whether or not the regulation
is content based, meaning that the kind of speech at stake determines the law that applies. Id. If it is
content-based, it is presumptively invalid. Id.
246. Id. at 1027-28. Again, the goals were essentially to protect the privacy of the home and the
public from fraud and abuse. Id.
247. Id. at 1027-28.
248. Id.
249. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-187, § 2, 117 Stat. 2699-2700 (2003).
250. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970) (discussing the
principle of individual autonomy); see also supra Part II.
1050
[Vol. 32: 1021, 2005] Is Spam the Rock of Sisyphus?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
dealt with at a time chosen by the recipient. It is invariably
unwanted and adds to the stress of daily life.251
As a result of this distinction, it is possible that the third prong of
Central Hudson would not be satisfied.252 The individual already has some
autonomy over the inconvenience caused by spam, being able to choose
when to view it or delete it. 253 However, if it can be shown that a substantial
number of commercial e-mail is false or misleading, or that it causes
significant damage to consumers or businesses, then courts may find that the
government interest outweighs that of the telemarketers. 254  Further, if the
government can show that the list will decrease the number of illegal e-
mails, while allowing the consensual transmission of e-mail to continue,
then the means employed for the end may be reasonable and not too
255
excessive.
The Can-Spam Act in its current state does not require labeling or a do-
not-e-mail list, but is merely directed towards eliminating false or
misleading information and illegal spamming techniques. 256 If the FTC does
end up implementing these provisions, however, there is a chance that direct
marketers will get frustrated with the move toward an opt-in scheme.257
Furthermore, when the FTC considers its duty to collaborate with global
anti-spain strategists, it will be necessary to once again draw upon the
balancing test set down in Central Hudson to ensure that all rights are
protected. First, let us turn to the international regulations already in place.
V. SPAM LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
The Can-Spam Act includes a provision directing the FTC to cooperate
with international fora to strategize and determine regulations that will
potentially impact spammers outside the U.S. as well as within.258 The
251. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270 (D. Colo. 2003)
(emphasis added).
252. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of NY, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
253. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs. Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
254. In fact, e-mail is arguably more intrusive nowadays than the telephone. Since it is possible to
turn a phone off and not answer calls, telemarketing may not be as disruptive as the Mainstream
court proclaimed. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270 (D. Colo.
2003). Meanwhile, e-mail has undeniably become one of the primary sources of communication
around the world. See Patrick Seitz, Next Wave Of Advances In Tech Will "Surprise Us," Gates
Predicts; Software's Only Begun to Impact How We Live, Work and Learn, He Says, INv. Bus.
DAILY April 26,2004, at A01.
255. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. This is the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.
Id.
256. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 250-55.
258. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act § 2(12).
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importance of this provision lies in the need for a uniform system of
regulation, especially given the fact that many spammers have retreated to
countries with less stringent or no restrictions in the wake of legislation in
the U.S. 259
A. The European Directives
Though Europe has not experienced spai as acutely as the U.S., the
European Union (E.U.) has reacted to the spam scare by establishing a
variety of different schemes.26°  Spammers in Europe may be directly
impacted by some or all of them.
261
The first Directive to potentially impact the fight against spain was The
Data Protection Directive of 1995.262 The Directive defines "personal data"
as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person"
and mandates that it should be collected fairly for a specified purpose.263
The French government further specified that: "[t]he manner in which e-mail
addresses are collected on the Internet must be in conformity with the rules
laid down by data protection legislation and with the rights of the persons
concerned. ' '264  Relying on these definitions of data protection, arguments
can be made against spamming techniques, such as "harvesting"
addresses. 265  However, the Directive had not yet directly broached that
subject. 266
In 1997, the E.U. passed a Telecommunications Directive, which, like
the United States' TCPA, "forbids the use of automated dialing or fax
machines for the purposes of direct marketing without the prior consent of
the consumer. 2 67  This followed the earlier Distance Selling Directive,
drafted in 1992 to require an opt-in scheme for fax and automated calls and
259. See, e.g., China: Please Delete, Bus. CHINA, Oct. 11, 2004, at 5 (discussing the fact that
China is now the source of most of the world's unsolicited e-mail).
260. See John Magee, The Law Regulating Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail: An International
Perspective, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 333 (2003). The reason for the
absence of litigation can perhaps be explained by the fact that the transposition deadlines for some of
the Directives mentioned in this section are relatively recent, and it has not occurred to a number of
Member States to seek legal remedies for violations. Serge Gauthronet & Etienne Drouard,
Unsolicited Commercial Communications and Data Protection 5, 87 (Jan. 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarketlprivacy/docs/studies/spamstudy--:en.pdf [hereinafter
ARETE Report]. Furthermore, the usual response by spam recipients is to complain to their ISP,
because the inconvenience caused is not perceived as sufficiently serious to warrant legal
proceedings. Id. at 87.
261. See Magee, supra note 260, at 363-64.
262. Id. at 365-66; see also Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (1995) [hereinafter
Dir. 95/46/EC], available at http://europa.eu.intlcomnlintemalmarket/privacy/docs/95-46-
ce/dir1995-46_partlen.pdf.
263. Dir. 95/46/EC, supra note 262, at 38. See also Magee, supra note 260, at 365.
264. ARETE Report, supra note 260, at 84. In line with this reasoning, a company in Spain who
sent unsolicited e-mails despite requests to cease, was sued under the Spanish version of the E.U.'s
Data Protection Directive. Id. at 83-84. The Spanish Data Protection Agency found that an
individual's e-mail address constituted personal data for purposes of the Directive. Id.
265. Magee, supra note 260, at 365-66.
266. Id. at 364.
267. Id. at 366-67; see also Council Directive 97/66/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 24) 1 (2000).
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an opt-out scheme for other communication channels. 268 Though e-mail was
not explicitly mentioned in that Directive, it is assumed that the phrase
"other communication channels" comprises e-mail, thus implicating an opt-
out scheme.269
The Electronic Commerce Directive was the first legislation in Europe
to explicitly refer to unsolicited commercial e-mail, calling it "undesirable
for consumers and information society service providers." 270 This Directive
established a requirement for labeling as well as an "opt-out register" to be
checked by marketers regularly, thus promoting the less stringent standard
by which e-mail marketers can continue to send unsolicited e-mails.27' After
its publication in October 1998, the issue of whether to require an opt-in or
opt-out mechanism was deliberated further among the E.U. Member States,
European online industry organizations, ISPs, associations of consumers and
Intemet users, and national data protection authorities.272
It was not until the Electronic Communications Privacy Directive was
proposed in 2000 that the E.U. first suggested the stricter compulsory opt-in
standard for unsolicited commercial e-mail marketers.273 This scheme
would require the explicit consent of the recipient prior to sending any
commercial e-mail, forbid the concealment of identity by the spammer, and
mandate a valid address by which the recipient may opt-out.
274
After hammering through an opt-in proposal for two years, the Directive
on Privacy and Electronic Communications ("E-Communications
Directive") was finally adopted on July 12, 2002.275 This Directive is an
extension of the Data Protection Directive of 1995276 as well as an
adaptation of the Telecommunications Directive to the electronic
communications sector.277 It requires the prior explicit consent of recipients
before sending any communications by means of automated calling
machines, fax, or e-mail.278 The Directive does make two exceptions to this
268. Magee, supra note 260, at 367-68.
269. See ARETE Report, supra note 260, at 73-75.
270. Magee, supra note 260, at 368 (quoting Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178)
1,5 (2000), available at http://europa.eu.intleur-lexlprilen/oj/dat120001-1781-17820000717
enOO010016.pdf).
271. Id. at 368-69.
272. ARETE Report, supra note 260, at 78-79.
273. Magee, supra note 260, at 370.
274. Id. at 371-73.
275. See Dir. 2002/58/EC, supra note 15.
276. Id. at 37-38.
277. Id. at 37. It defines communications as including "any naming, numbering or addressing
information provided by the sender of a communication or the user of a connection to carry out the
communication." Id. at 38. One significant goal of the Directive was to harmonize the relevant
Directives to minimize the obstacles to electronic communications in Europe. Id. at 37.
278. Id. at 45. The Directive defines consent as "given by any appropriate method enabling a
freely given specific and informed indication of the user's wishes, including by ticking a box when
visiting an Internet website. Id. at 38.
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"opt-in" rule: (1) allowing a marketer to contact customers who have
provided electronic contact information in the context of a business
transaction,279 and (2) allowing a marketer to contact non-natural persons.28°
In both cases, the recipient of unsolicited communication must have the
clear opportunity to refuse further contact.28'
B. Impact of the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications
In response to the recommendation that Member States transpose the
Directive by October 2003,282 many countries have implemented the opt-in
scheme in the form of local laws. 283 Critics have remarked, however, that
adding another local law will not make an obvious difference: "Responsible
companies will observe regulations and life will become more difficult for
them while the real nuisances will still be out there causing problems. ' ' 8
The opt-in mechanism (which is even stricter than the United States'
opt-out) is viewed as too "soft" and, at times, ineffective.285 For example,
companies that have retrieved e-mail addresses from customers in the course
of a sale or service can then use that address for marketing purposes, even if
the customer has previously opted Out.
2 86
On the other end of the spectrum, the Direct Marketing Association is
concerned that "parts of the regulations may cause uncertainty for
businesses.2 87 Most British companies are "not up to speed" on how they
may affect their online advertising formats.288 Further, the Directive could
have serious repercussions for marketers who are not prepared for the
279. Id. at 45.
280. Id. at 46.
281. Id. at 45-46.
282. Id. at 46.
283. In the U.K., for example, the new law mimics the Directive. Lee, supra note 17, at 8. In
Italy also, the Data Protection Authority issued a ruling that enforces the "opt-in" mechanism. See
Esther Van Weert, Privacy Authority Clamps Down On Spammers, WORLD EBUSINESS LAW
REPORT, available at http://www.worldebusinesslawreport.com/ (Oct. 14, 2003). The ruling
establishes that marketers must:
[1] obtain a recipient's informed consent before sending any advertising or promotional
material via email; [2] ensure that all communications contain their full contact details;
[3] give recipients the opportunity to exercise their privacy rights (e.g., the right to revoke
consent and to request information about the data source) in every communication; and
[4] ascertain whether all the individuals listed in a database that has been bought from a
third party have consented to receive advertising and promotional material.
Id. See also Emily Booth, Vox-Pop: How Will the EC Directive Affect Digital Marketers?,
REVOLUTION, available at 2004 WL 55093565 (Jan. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Booth].
284. Lee, supra note 16, at 8.
285. Id.
286. See Dir. 2002/58/EC, supra note 15, at 45; John Naughton, Business: The Networker: Expect
to Keep Hitting That Delete Button, THE OBSERVER, Dec. 14, 2003, at 8.
287. Lee, supra note 16, at 8.
288. Naughton, supra note 286, at 8. This includes a legitimate concern over how to design the
"tick-the-box" option, wherein a customer essentially opts in to future mailings. Id. "To be legal
from now on, the label on such a check-box must say 'tick here if you wish to receive marketing
information.' Failure to tick the box can no longer be construed as passive consent." Id.
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changes. 289  "For a marketing company to be found guilty of spamming
(even if the e-mail was sent innocently) and fined would be extremely
damaging, not only to the firm but to the brands it represents. 29 °
As a result, marketers will need to implement stringent guidelines to
clarify the motives of their messages so they won't be confused with
spam.291  The best way to do so, it is argued, "is to build in-house opt-in
lists, which can be used to target customers during all [their] online
campaigns. 292 This method ensures that marketers will target customers
who have specifically agreed to receive communications.29 3
In regard to these more stringent guidelines, the regulations are
commended for creating better data management in the industry.294 There is
a greater balance between what consumers can control via opt-in and who
marketers can target with valuable communications. 295 Thus, the "focus on
relationships and increased value for consumers should lead to the creative
content of digital communications being increasingly tailored and
relevant. ,296
C. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
The Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications also proposes
not to "alter the existing balance between the individual's right to privacy
and... lawful interception of electronic communications. 297 However, it
does not directly address the freedom of expression that is a corollary to the
First Amendment protection in the United States.298 Some understanding of
Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
289. Booth, supra note 283.







296. Id. This harmonizing view is essentially the premise behind a permission-based marketing
scheme. ARETE Report, supra note 260, at 23-24. The ARETE report noted the success of several
permission based marketing schemes, prior to enacting the Directive. Id. at 40-47. It also
highlighted methods by which marketers could acquire the personal data they needed, such as
placing opt-in forms on their website, which visitors must complete to subscribe, and sending a
second welcome e-mail (double opt-in mechanism). Id. at 50-55.
297. Dir. 2002/58/EC, supra note 275, at 38. These provisions are guarantees of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that relate to the right to
privacy and freedom from governmental interference. See European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 7, 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
ECHRFF], available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf.
298. However, Section III, Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive provides for exemptions
from its provisions where "necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing
freedom of expression." Dir. 95/46/EC, supra note 15, at 42.
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and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHRFF) is necessary for recognizing the
scope of this right in Europe.
1.. Commercial Speech under the European Convention
Although European countries do not have the same expansive
constitutional protections as the United States, member states of the
European Union are protected by the ECHRFF. Article 10 of that Charter
provides: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. '299
There is limited case law concerning the extent of commercial speech
allowed by Article 10. However, there are some cases that may shed some
light on the balance between the protection of individual privacy and the
right to freely communicate in Europe.
In Barthold v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
determined that commercial speech was directly connected with Article 10
freedoms. 3°  In that case, a veterinary surgeon challenged a rule of
professional conduct obliging him to refrain from advertising and
publicity.3°' In reaching its decision, the ECHR relied on both E.U. and U.S.
law to reason that "[rlegulation in this sphere is of course legitimate.., but
in order to maintain the free flow of information any restriction imposed
should answer a 'pressing social need' and not mere expediency. 3 °2 The
ECHR found that there was no pressing social need to refrain from
advertising altogether, so the regulation was overbroad in the context of
Article 10.'03
The ECHR similarly weighed freedom of expression against a legitimate
need for quality and balance of television programs in Demuth v.
Switzerland.304  The applicant here claimed that the federal council's
decision not to give him a license to broadcast his show violated Article
10.305 The ECHR disagreed because, although the refusal to grant a license
interfered with the applicant's right to expression, the interference was
justified by the policies of the television programs to "contribute 'to general,
varied and objective information to the public' [and] ... 'bring closer to the
299. ECHRFF, supra note 297, art. 10. The Convention further provides that:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Id. art. 10(2).
300. Barthold v. Germany, App. No. 8734/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 383, 397-98 (1985).
301. Id. at 396.
302. Id. at 408.
303. Id.
304. Demuth v. Switzerland, App. No. 38743/97, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 423 (2002).
305. Id. at 428.
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public, the diversity of the country'; and... 'promote Swiss cultural
enterprise. ' ' 306  The ECHR did acknowledge, however, that in order to
encourage the free flow of information, supervision of such policies must be
strict when they interfered with Article 10 rights and freedoms. °7
In Casado Coca v. Spain, the ECHR again discussed the issue of
whether advertising restrictions infringed upon the freedoms provided for in
Article 10.308 There, the Barcelona Bar Council brought disciplinary
proceedings against a lawyer who placed advertisements in local
newspapers.30 9 The ECHR found that the lawyer was guaranteed freedom of
expression by Article 10, regardless of whether his aim was profit-making,
rather than political or artistic.310 While the ECHR recognized that
advertising may sometimes be restricted, especially to prevent the
transmission of unfair competition and untruthful or misleading information,
any restrictions must be closely scrutinized by the Court. 1'
Despite this "close scrutiny" standard, the ECHR in Casado Coca
ultimately gave deference to the Barcelona Bar, since, although the bar
banned advertising, it still authorized members to express their views to the
media, make themselves known, and take part in the public debate. 1 2 The
Bar rules were designed to protect the interests of the public while ensuring
respect for its members.313 Thus, the Bar authorities and Spain's courts were
in a better position to determine the appropriate balance between the
interests involved.31 4
2. Application of Article 10 to Electronic Commerce Directives
Article 10 and the scope of protection for commercial speech will likely
be referenced in challenges against European anti-spam regulations. In the
Netherlands, for example, there has already been some indication that the
new model code for e-mail marketing, adapted from the latest "E-
Communications" Directive, will be challenged as inconsistent with freedom
306. Id. at 434.
307. Id. at 433.
308. Casado Coca v. Spain, App. No. 15450/89, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1994).
309. Id. at 2-3.
310. Id. at 20. The distinction was made because traditionally, a stricter standard of protection is
afforded speech that is artistic, literary or political. See Dir. 95/46/EC, supra note 262, Recital 17.
However, the ECHR noted that Article 10 "does not apply solely to certain types of information
or... forms of expression, in particular those of a political nature; it also encompasses artistic
expression [and] information of a commercial nature .... Casado Coca, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 20
(citations omitted).
311. Id. at 15.




of expression. 3'5 The argument is that the language adopted for the opt-in
regime is unclear, since it does not specify what types of practices constitute
"consent."'31 6 As a result, direct marketers are claiming that any limitations
on established practices, like trading e-mail addresses, would curtail their
freedoms.317
An action against the "E-Communications" Directive was recently
brought by an e-mail marketer in Spain who controlled an Internet site that
sent unsolicited e-mails with an easy opt-out mechanism. 3 8 The applicant
argued that, upon the Directive's implementation, his business would incur
substantial cost from the need to send registered letters to each of his
correspondents before sending Intemet mailings. 3 9 He argued further that
the Directive violated his freedom of expression, protected under Article 10
of the European Convention, among other treaties. 320 However, the Court of
the First Instance (Fourth Chamber) denied standing to the applicant, since
the Directive did not individually concern him.32' The Directive had merely
affected the applicant's capacity as an Internet user just as it affected other
business users on the Internet.322  Because the action was rendered
inadmissible, there was not a substantial discussion of the Directive's impact
on Article 10 freedoms.
Should an Article 10 argument be raised in another case against
European anti-spam regulations, it is hard to predict exactly what the ECHR
would decide. Based on Demuth v. Switzerland, the ECHR likely would
strictly scrutinize any regulation that prevented the free flow of information
and expressions. 323  At the same time, unlike the outright ban on public
advertising in Barthold v. Germany, the elimination of unwanted, unsolicited
e-mail will likely be recognized as a "pressing social need. '32 4 Finally, as
long as advertisers have alternate means to reach the public, the ECHR can
legitimize anti-spain regulations in the interests of individual privacy.325
Within that line of reasoning, the ECHR would likely validate the opt-in
315. See Louis Jonker, Marketing Organizations Argue Over Trade in E-mail Addresses, WORLD
EBUSINESs LAW REPORT, available at http://www.worldebusinesslawreport.com (Oct. 1, 2003).
316. For example, one company that already has an established business relationship with a
consumer will trade e-mail addresses with another company. It is unclear under the Directives
whether the latter company would have the consent required by an opt-in regime to contact the
recipients of the traded e-mail addresses. See Dir. 2002/58/EC, supra note 275, at 45 ("[Wlhere a
natural or legal person obtains from its customers their electronic contact details for electronic mail,
in the context of the sale of a product or service ... the same natural or legal person may use these
electronic contact details for direct marketing of its own similar products.").
317. Jonker, supra note 315.
318. Vannieuwenhuyze-Morin v. European Parliament, available in French at http://europa.eu.int/





323. See Demuth v. Switzerland, App. No. 38743/97, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 423 (2002).
324. See Barthold v. Germany, App. No. 8734/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 383, 397-98 (1985).
325. See Casado Coca v. Spain, App. No. 15450t89, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1994).
1058
[Vol. 32: 1021, 2005] Is Spam the Rock of Sisyphus?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
scheme, since it is not an outright ban on e-mail advertising, but rather a
permission based alternative.
In conclusion, the European Directive calls for an opt-in scheme that
may seriously affect the way marketers do business. It is likely that this
provision will survive challenges based on Article 10 of the European
Convention, if ever asserted, since the elimination of unsolicited e-mail is a
pressing social need, and there are alternate means of advertising. Thus, it
will be important at this stage to reach a consensus on the international scope
of Europe's opt-in scheme, if it is to have any impact on spammers around
the world.
VI. THE CALL FOR RECONCILIATION - CAN SPAM BE ELIMINATED?
The rise of the global computer network is destroying the link
between geographical location and (1) the power of [the] local
[government] to assert control over online behavior; (2) the effects
of online behaviour on individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy of
[the efforts of] a local [sovereign to enforce rules applicable to]
global phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical location to give
notice of which sets of rules apply.32 6
Given the universal nature of the Internet, jurisdiction matters not only
in the United States, but around the world.321 Some commentators say that it
should be determined by where the Internet server is located.328 Others
contend that mere physical presence in a particular state does not provide
sufficient contacts to create jurisdiction over a Web site.329
In Europe, the Electronic Commerce Directives employ a "country of
origin" approach to determine jurisdiction over ISPs. 330  This approach
dictates that, without an agreement to the contrary, law will govern in "the
country in which an [ISP] maintains a fixed establishment, regardless of
where the Web site or server is located. ' '331  Despite these provisions,
unsolicited spam will continue to pose enforcement problems, since laws in
326. Magee, supra note 260, at 379 (quoting David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders -
The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1370 (1996) (advocating self-regulation of the
Internet on a global level)).
327. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 160, at 825-26.
328. See Andre R. Jaglom, Liability On-Line: Choice of Law and Jurisdiction on the Internet, or
Who's In Charge Here?, available at http://www.tanhelp.com/newsworthyIArticles/LiabilityOn-
Line.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
329. Id. at 2-3.
330. Id. at I.
331. Id. This principle does not apply to consumer transaction contracts, for which consumers
remain protected by the laws of their own nation. Id. However, the Directives recommend that
companies selling over the Internet consider jurisdiction both with regard to electronic transactions
in general, and "with regard to how the contract is executed and performed." Id.
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individual countries will not have any power over messages originating from
other countries.332 Thus it will be necessary to reach a common ground, both
legally and technologically.
A. An Opt-In Scheme in the U.S.?
The essential difference between the European and American approach
to anti-spain legislation is that the former mandates an opt-in scheme. 333 A
report put out by the E.U.'s ARETE Commission in January 2001 included
an exhaustive study of the span problem and what individual countries were
doing about it.3 3 In advocating the more stringent opt-in approach to spam,
the authors of the ARETE report relied on the theory that permission-based
marketing was a more effective way to meet consumers who were willing to
participate in an exchange. 3 5 These authors noted that the opt-out approach,
on the other hand, "amounts to giving the e-mail user a sponge to mop up a
flood of commercial messages which will never run dry... depriv[ing]
Internet users of their rights over their own mailboxes.
33 6
Should Congress decide to amend the Can-Spam Act to bring it into
conformity with. the European scheme, the question remains whether an opt-
in scheme would pass constitutional muster.337 In this analysis, courts would
likely draw on cases challenging the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA), and specific provisions relating to prerecorded telephone calls and
unsolicited facsimiles. 338 They may note that an opt-in scheme is already
essentially in place for the use of fax and pre-recorded advertising.339 The
332. One writer reported:
Legislation varies, even within the EU.... In Germany it is far easier to deal with spam
than here, but in the U.S. it is not, although California has just introduced regulations.
An international treaty would be the best way forward, but some of the countries we are
talking about don't even have proper domestic legislation.
See Lee, supra note 16, at 8 (internal quotations omitted).
In the UK, where spam legislation has already taken effect, critics also say: "It is hard to
see what any regulations in this country can do.... A lot of problem spams come from
overseas, often Asia or the U.S., so it makes little difference that there is legislation in the
UK." Id.
333. See generally Brandon Mitchener, Europe Blames Weaker U.S. Law for Spam Surge, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 3, 2004, at B 1.
334. ARETE Report, supra note 260, at 5.
335. Id. at 23. The authors relied on SETH GODIN, PERMISSION MARKETING: TURNING
STRANGERS INTO FRIENDS, AND FRIENDS INTO CUSTOMERS (Simon & Schuster 1999) for this
approach. Id. at 23-24. They also pointed to an IMT Strategies report that indicated a greater
response rate for permission based e-mails. Id. at 25-26 (citing IMT, Permission E-mail: The Future
of Direct Marketing, available at http://ezine-tips.com/list-tips/list-advertising/19991207.shtl).
That study showed that 70% of Internet users clicked either a few times, several times, or often on
advertising messages sent by permission, compared with just 30% in the case of unsolicited e-mails.
Id. at 26.
336. Id. at 65.
337. Europe has been calling for the U.S. to crack down on spam by using on opt-in scheme.
Mitchener, supra note 334, at B 1. The Organization for Cooperation and Development also meets
on a regular basis to encourage greater international law-enforcement cooperation to fight spamners.
Id.
338. See supra Part IV.C.
339. See U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A)-(D).
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court has upheld this scheme in challenges such as Mainstream on two
primary grounds: "[O]ne was that a fax coming in would occupy the line and
prevent legitimate business activities, and the second was that unsolicited
faxes shifted the costs of advertising to the recipient, forcing it to incur paper
and toner charges., 340 Just as with faxes, sending large volumes of e-mail
shifts advertising costs to the consumer, while the cost to the spammer is
negligible.34'
It is possible that an outright ban on spam would limit commercial
expression by eliminating solicitation. The Supreme Court has recognized
that "solicitation allows direct and spontaneous communication between
buyer and seller... so solicitation produces more personal interchange
between buyer and seller than would occur if only buyers were permitted to
initiate contact. 342 Thus, even if the government were to show a substantial
interest in minimizing costs to consumers, courts would most likely find that
a total prohibition on spam would violate the Constitution.343
However, an opt-in scheme is not an outright ban on spam. Advertisers
still have an opportunity to reach consumers, as long as they obtain consent
through legitimate transactions. 344  There are also multiple avenues to
continue communicating with the public, such as television commercials,
banner ads, and other online mechanisms. Some concern may be
appropriate on the part of smaller businesses who cannot afford more savvy
advertising techniques. However, courts would need to carefully balance
these interests against the damage caused to Internet communications by the
volume of unwanted spare.
34 5
Even were an opt-in scheme to be deployed in the United States, it is
likely that spain will continue to thrive, due to easy access to consumer
information and limited enforcement mechanisms against spammers without
a physical address.346 Thus, because of the limited scope of both the Can-
Spam Act and the European Directives, it is necessary to consider alternate
means of ridding the world of span.
340. Johnson, supra note 115, at 7.
341. Id. One potential distinction is that use of phones and faxes may completely block business'
use of the phone lines, while use of e-mail does not necessarily block Internet connections, at least
for users with large storage space. Id.
342. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 766 (1992).
343. See Johnson, supra note 115, at 8.
344. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
345. Johnson, supra note 115, at 7.
346. See Naughton, supra note 286, at 8; see generally Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, §§ 5(a)(3), 5(a)(6), 7, 11, 117 Stat.
2699, 2707-08, 2711, 2717 (2003) (providing only for "who" may bring an action against those who
violate the Act, not "how").
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B. Self-Regulation
Law in Cyberspace is slowly evolving into a balance between
governmental micromanagement and decentralized regulation by website
owners and companies. 47 Without stringent government regulation in the
realm of spam, companies have considered methods of self-governance. 48
Microsoft has an anti-spain policy that prohibits the use of MSN
services "in any manner associated with the transmission, distribution or
delivery of any unsolicited bulk or unsolicited commercial e-mail." 349 In
addition to prohibiting users from delivering spam to any of Microsoft's
MSN services or customers, the policy does not allow users to:
[1] use or contain invalid or forged headers; [2] use or contain
invalid or non-existent domain names; [3] employ any technique to
otherwise misrepresent, hide or obscure any information in
identifying the point of origin or the transmission path; [4] use other
means of deceptive addressing; [5] use a third party's [I]nternet
domain name, or be relayed from or through a third party's
equipment, without permission of the third party; [6] contain false
or misleading information in the subject line or otherwise contain
false or misleading content. ... 350
Microsoft provides for enforcement of its policies by blocking messages
from a particular Internet domain, or taking legal action.3
Similarly, America Online's anti-spain policy "does not authorize the
use of its proprietary computers and computer network (the AOL Network')
[sic] to accept, transmit or distribute unsolicited bulk e-mail sent from the
Internet to AOL members. 352 The policy prohibits the use of invalid or
forged headers, deceptive advertising, or harvesting.353 AOL will also take
legal and technical steps to prevent the unauthorized use of e-mail. 354
The Direct Marketing Association (DMA) is a strong advocate of self-
regulation techniques, and in fact has set up its own "Electronic Mail
Preference Service" ("e-MPS") to allow users to opt-out of unsolicited e-
mail. 355 However, the DMA's methods have been criticized by anti-spam
activists because: 1) opt-out lists are based on the principle that the onus is
on users to take action, 2) ISPs can't opt-out of an entire domain, and 3) the
347. For a full discussion of governance on the Internet, see The Culture of Cyberspace, 93 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 354 (1999) [hereinafter "Culture of Cyberspace"].
348. See, e.g., Microsoft Anti-Spam Policy, http://privacy.msn.comlanti-spam (last modified Sept.
2003); AOL Unsolicited Bulk E-Mail Policy, http://postmaster.info.aol.com/guidelines/bulk-
email.html (highlighting some common anti-spam policies by private actors).
349. See Microsoft Anti-Spam Policy, supra note 348.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See AOL Unsolicited Bulk E-Mail Policy, supra note 348.
353. Id.
354. Id. AOL's policy lists actions under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Virginia
Computer Crimes Act, and the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003. Id.
355. ARETE Commission, supra note 260, at 29.
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DMA wants to preserve unsolicited commercial e-mail as a powerful
marketing tool, rather than solely permission based. 6
Although these policies inherently require legal enforcement, many
would argue that "[t]he most successful battle against spam is being waged
through technology by large companies and ISPs. ' 357  This is largely
because those companies have the resources and means to employ a variety
of different filtering techniques. 8 The ultimate question is whether any of
the policies above will be able to succeed in eliminating spam in the face of
continually sophistocated technology.
C. How to Fight Back
While bulk e-mail has shown no sign of waning since its inception.359
there is a plethora of measures available for individuals to keep the spam at
bay. For example, an international group called "The Spamhaus Project"
regularly releases "block lists," which block incoming spam from direct
spam sources.3 60  Similarly, some anti-spam groups provide black lists,
consisting of the IP addresses of repeat spanmers. 36' The lists allow
corporate systems to block messages from those addresses.362 A potential
problem with this technique is that, in order to save legitimate messages,
users must know how to reverse the process by creating "white list"
addresses.363 A recently implemented program called "Mailblocks" is a
web-based service that allows users to apply a challenge/response system, by
which a sender must answer a question prior to sending the e-mail.36
4
Automated spam systems will fail this test, either because they can't
respond, or because they use false return addresses.365
Microsoft has suggested a new approach to the elimination of spam. It
is currently working with e-mail providers to set up a sort of "caller ID"
system for the Internet.366 Under this system, ISPs and corporate e-mail
356. Id.
357. Johnson, supra note 115, at 4.
358. Id.
359. See, e.g., Bulk Email Software, http://www.americaint.com/bulk-email-software/email-
marketing-software.html (last visted Mar. 31, 2005) (providing more information on the latest bulk
e-mail products on the market).
360. See The Spamhaus Project, http://www.spamhaus.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
361. Johnson, supra note 115, at 4.
362. Id.
363. Id. "White lists" would consist of addresses from which the user will accept messages. Id.
364. Walter S. Mossberg, Mailblocks Will Keep Your Mail Spam-Free, Without the Guesswork,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2004, at B1.
365. Id. Mailblocks also allow users to receive "good" automated e-mail, like online newsletters
or purchase confirmations, by creating "tracker" addresses, which are used to sign up for various
services. Id.
366. Robert A. Guth & Mylene Mangalindan, Microsoft Takes "Caller ID" Tack Against Spam,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at B3.
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users would be required to post legitimate addresses, thus creating a registry
for e-mail recipients seeking to authenticate messages. 367 This method
would verify the e-mail senders' identities, rather than just filter out
unwanted mail. 3
68
Although the computer software industry is getting smarter with its anti-
spam filters,369 spammers have become equally more creative with the words
(or non-words) they use in order to avoid such filters. For example, you
might see solicitations for diet pills and other unsolicited goods using
phrases that often have nothing to do with the marketer's pitch, like
"congratulatory salaam transferred flatulent statesmen. 370
Individuals can also do a lot on their own, however, to eliminate
unwanted spam. "Tech Live," an online magazine with continual updates on
computer issues, gives some tips to beat spammers. 371 These include: 1)
installing a spam filter, 2) using several different e-mail accounts,372 3) using
"at" instead of "@" for the e-mail address,373 4) never unsubscribing to
span 374 and 5) never participating in a transaction with a spam marketer. 375
Although many of these techniques are tedious and time-consuming,
they may be the only way, and indeed, a necessary way to truly attack the
spam problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because it appears that an opt-out scheme will be largely ineffective
against spammers who follow the guidelines, the recent enactment of the
Can-Spam Act will do' little to rid our inboxes of unwanted mail.
37 6
However, it is a step in the right direction, if it supplements the efforts of
direct marketing organizations and Internet service providers to implement
technologically feasible methods to give consumers autonomy over their
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See Symantec Products and Services, http://www.symantec.com/product/ (last visited Mar.
31, 2005) (providing news and information on the latest products put out by Symantec and IBM).
370. Pui-Wing Tam, Fruitcake Debutantes Defined by 0, and Other Spain Tricks, WALL ST. J.,
May 28, 2004, at B 1.
371. See Lindsay Martell, Fight Spain: Tips for Stopping the Endless Barrage of Unwanted Email,
available at http://www.g4tv.com/techtvvault/features/43639/FightSpam.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2005).
372. Id. For example, use one for online sign-ups, another for newsletters, and a personal one
strictly for closest friends and family. Id.
373. Id. This is because spain engines won't recognize it as an e-mail address, but humans would
change it back. Id.
374. Id. That's how they figure out your live e-mail address. Id.
375. Id.
376. See Can-Spare Law Violations Continue at High Rate for Second Month in a Row, According
to Audiotrieve InBoxerAnti-Spam Study, Bus. WIRE, Feb. 10, 2004. Studies show that "[mlore than
86 percent of the spam messages studied violated at least one aspect of the CAN-SPAM law and
most violated almost all of the provisions." Id. Thus "CAN-SPAM is failing to stop the plague of
unwanted email messages." Id. See also Ryan J. Foley & Don Clark, Spam Pact Toughens
Penalties, But Critics See a Lack of Muscle, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2003, at A3; see also supra Part
IV.
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inboxes. 377 Moreover, the current provisions of the Can-Spam Act are likely
to pass constitutional muster, since the government's interest in protecting
the public from fraud and deceptive marketing tactics is substantial, and the
elimination of illegal spamming techniques is not excessive.3 78 If a "Do-
Not-E-Mail" registry were implemented by the FTC, it may withstand
constitutional challenge as well, due to recent decisions upholding the "Do-
Not-Call" list.3
79
While it seems as though the opt-in scheme proposed by the European
Directives will be more effective at stamping out spam on an international
level, there remain some constitutional concerns with its implementation in
the United States. 8° The opt-in scheme poses potential problems for newly
developed businesses that do not already have a broad consumer base.38'
Unless U.S. courts recognize that an opt-in scheme would allow for alternate
means of communication, such as permission-based marketing, then this
scheme would likely be subject to the limitations of the Constitution.382
Self-regulation and filtering technology remain available to consumers
who wish to rid their inboxes of unsolicited e-mail altogether. Technology
is subject to error, however, and the fight continues to escalate as spammers
become more sophisticated. Thus, while technology and the law attempt to
meet on common ground, the rock of Sisyphus rolls right back down. And it
appears that the only way to beat spain completely is by the individual stroke
of the "delete" key.383
Amy G. Marino
3 4
377. See supra Part VI.C.
378. See supra Part IV.C.
379. See supra Part IV.C.2.b.
380. See supra Part VI.A.
381. See generally Brandon Mitchener, Europe Blames Weaker U.S. Law for Spam Surge, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 3, 2004, at B 1.
382. See supra note 110-12 and accompanying text.
383. See generally Zuzel, supra note 2.
384. J.D. Candidate 2005. B.A./B.M., Oberlin College and Conservatory 1998. Thank you,
Mark and Matthew, and all who encouraged me to finish this comment and my law school
education. The topic can be attributted to the spammers who still invade my inbox.
1065
1066
